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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the nineteenth century~ while Freud was 
laying the foundation for psychoanalysis in Vienna~ Wundt, in 
Leipzig~ was establishing experimental psychology. This close 
relationship in time and space was sharply contrasted by the great 
distance between the two emerging fields in content and theoreti-
cal approach. Psychoanalysis developed in a clinical setting, 
whereas experimental psychology was rooted in the psychophysics 
laboratory. Throughout the initial stage of development, each of 
these fields went its own way. Besides the differences in content 
and theoretical approach, another factor also contributed to this 
mutual isolation. This was the absence of individuals who could 
be simultaneously interested in, and informed of, both fields. 
There is today a strong relationship between psychoanalysis 
and much of experimental psychology. The growth of interest in 
the projective techniques exerted a significant influence on this 
interaction. This is an area in which the variables important in 
psychoanalytic theory can be studied in relation to the variables 
dealt with in psychophysics. There is much to be gained in bring-
ing the experimental rigor of psychology together with the richness 
of content offered by psychoanalytic observations and theory. 
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The present study is in many respects a product of this 
interaction, since it deals with the relationship between psycho-
logical defense and decision making. More specifically, it relates 
repressive and intellectualized defense preferences to perceptual 
decision making under two different conditions of stress. It was 
hoped that the experiment would contribute to the understanding of 
the processes through which psychological defenses operate in per-
ceptual and cognitive behavior. 
It was not an interest in decision making per ~ which gave 
rise to this study. Rather, it evolved from a concern with the 
problem of the relationship of psychological defense to processes 
of inference in general. Much perceptual, cognitive and inter-
personal behavior is governed by the manner in which we arrive at 
conclusions from less than complete information. 
People differ in regard to the number of different hypoth-
eses which they formulate when confronted with the task of making 
a decision regarding the nature of a stimulus. Similarly, there 
is much individual variation with respect to the need to ncheCk 
outn a stimulus before one makes a decision about it. It appears 
that extreme approaches to these aspects of perceptual decision 
making underlie many of the commonly dichotomized personality 
ntraits" of·clinical and theoretical interest. Such concepts as 
impulsivity-caution, intolerance-tolerance of ambiguity, rigidity-
flexibility, and certainty-doubt may well be related to the manner 
with which individuals approach problems of inference. 
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In the present study~ it is hypothesized that a major deter-
minant of perceptual decision making behavior is defense preference. 
Repressive and intellectualized defenses were selected for study, 
since both clinical observation and psychoanalytic theory indicate 
that these defenses predispose individuals to contrasting approaches 
to problems of inference. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND RELATED RESEARCH 
The psychoanalytic theory of defense, Bruner's approach 
to perceptionl$ and literature dealing with psychological stress 
served as the theoretical basis for the present study. The em-
pirical baCkground included studies involving the relationships 
of personality variables and psychological stress to complex 
mental performance. 
I. PSYCHOANAL'!TIC DEFENSE THEORY 
According to psychoanalytic theory, a defense is any 
psychological process which an individual employs to prevent 
expression of threatening impulses in order to avoid the pain-
ful consequences of such expression. Adaptive coping with life 
requires the individual to satisfy, often through compromise, 
the simultaneous and, sometimes, contradictory, demands of his 
impulses and his environment. The defenses serve, with widely 
varying degrees of success, to bring about such adaptation. 
Adaptive success varies in degree from severe psycho-
pathology to relative mental health. Psychoanalytic theory 
lJ. s. Bruner. On perceptual readiness. Psychol. !!Y·' 
1957~ 64, 123-152. 
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does not postulate any sharp cut-off points along this continuum 
of adjustment. The defenses, in and of themselves, are neither 
healthy nor pathological and are employed by all individuals 
regardless of their position along this conceptual continuum of 
adaptational success. That the defenses sometimes have been 
viewed as mainly pathogenic is probably due to the fact that Freud 
first described them as they occur in psychopathological settings. 
It is the failure of the defenses, however, and not their mere 
presence, which is associated with psychopathology. Anna Freud 
makes this point, when she writes, 
The existence of neurotic symptoms in itself indicates 
that the ego has been overpowered, and every return of 
repressed impulses, with its sequal in compromise-forma-
tion, shows that some plan for defense has miscarried and 
the ego has suffered a defeat, But the ego is victorious 
when its defensive measures effect their purpose, i.e. when 
they enable it to restrict the development of anxiety and 
"pain11 and so to transform the instincts that, even in most 
difficult circumstances, some measure of gratification is 
secured, thereby establishing the most harmonious relations 
possible between the id, the super-ego and the forces of 
the outside world.2 
This view does not minimize the fact that the defenses are 
potentially dangerous insofar as exaggerated employment of them 
is one definition of a pathological solution of conflict, but 
merely emphasizes that the defenses are not inherently destructive. 
-
The study of the defenses as they appear in psychopathology can 
2.Anua. Freud. The Ego ~ ~ Mechanisms of Defense. 
London: The Hogarth Press, 1936, p. 193. 
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shed light on their operation in normal mental .functioning. AJ..ong 
this line, Freud wrote, 
••• pathology, with its magnification and exaggeration, 
can make us aware of nor:rnal phenomena which we should 
otherwise have missed. Where pathology displays a 
breach or cleft, under normal conditions there may be 
a link. If we throw a crystal to the ground, it breaks, 
but it does not break haphazard; in accordance with the 
lines of cleavage it falls into fragments, whose limits 
were already determined by- t, structure of the crystal, 
although tbeywere invisible. 
The first two classes of defense differentiated by- Freud~ 
when be compared hysteria with phobic and obsessional states, were 
the repressive and intellectualized defenses. When the repressive 
defenses were employed, the threatening impulse was kept out of 
consciousness. When the intellectualized defenses were used, 
however, the threatening impulse remained in consciousness but 
its affective component was somehow altered. Regarding this 
restriction of consciousness by repression, Freud wrote, 
••• the essence of repression lies simply in the functio~ 
of rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness.4 
In contrast, when the intellectualized defenses were employed, 
Freud noted, 
••• the idea remains present in consciousness, detached from 
all associations; but its affect, now freed from it, attaches 
itself to other ideas which are not in themselves unbearable •••• 5 
3s .. Freud., New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis. 
New York: Carlton House, 1933, pp. 84-85.. -
4s. Freud. Repression.. In Collected Papers. Vol. IV. 
London~ The Hogarth Press, 1948, p. 86. 
5s. Freud. The defense neuro-psychoses. In Collected Papers. 
Vol. I. London:- The Hogarth Press, 1948, p. 66. 
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~he repressive class of defenses includes repression, which 
deals with disturbind instinctual demands, and denial, which is atmed 
at threatening external stimuli. Both of these repressive defenses 
serve to restrict conscious ideation. ~he intellectualized class 
of defenses includes isolation, which serves to remove the emotional 
significance of impulses, and intellectualization, which represents 
the translation of instinct into cognitive te~s. ~hese intellec-
tualized defenses promote conscious ideation. 
Fenichel 1s definition of repression is, 
••• an unconsciously purposeful forgetting or not becoming 
aware of internal impulses or external events which, as a 
rule, represent possible temptations or punishments for, 
or mere allusions to, objectionable instinctual demands. 
~he purposeful exclusion of these data from consciousness 
is obviously intended to hinder their real effects as well 
as the pain on becoming aware of them.6 
It is evident that defenses influence behavior in a wide 
variety of relatively non•conflictual situations. ~he ~nner in 
which repression generalizes to non-conflictual material is des-
cribed by Fenichel, when he writes, 
~he impression arises that the repressed is like a magnetic 
force attracting everything that has any connection with it, 
so that it, too, becomes repressed; actually, it does not 
attract associatively connected material into the repressed, 
but tries to transform it into a derivative, whereupon the 
same forces that had originally repressed it repress the 
new material as well.7 
6o. Fenichel. The Psychoanalytic Theory of ~ Neurosis. 
New York: W. w. Norton and Co., 1945, p. 148. 
7Fenichel, ~· cit., p. 149. 
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The similarity between repression and denial, whiCh has led 
to their being placed in the same defense class, is emphasized by 
Anna Freud, when she writes, 
Just as, in the neurotic conflict, perception of a prohibited 
instinctual impulse is warded off by means of repression, so 
the infantile ego resorts to denial in order not to become 
aware of some painful impression from without. 8 
Schafer defines denial as, 
••• the defensive refusal to aCknowledge the existence of 
disturbing external realities. The concept is, however, 
often used in a broader sense to include the refusal to 
acknowledge the existence of inner disturbed reactions to 
external provocations.9 
The intellectualized defenses were not as extensively elabor• 
ated in Freud's writings and, consequently, have not been defined 
as thoroughly. Intellectualization, according to Anna Freud, is, 
••• the attempt to lay hold on the instinctual processes 
by connecting them with ideas which can be dealt with in 
consciousness,lO 
whereas isolation, 
••• simply removes the instinctual impulses from their con-
text, while retaining them in consciousness.ll 
SAnna Freud. I!!!, Ego ~ ~ Mechanisms of Defense. 
London: The Hogarth Press, 1936, p. 96. 
9:a. Schafer. Psychoanalytic Interpretation ~ Rorschach 
Testing. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1954, p.54. 
lOA. Freud, ~· ~·, p. 178 
llA. Freud, ££· ~., pp. 37-38. 
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Schafer writes that, 
Isolation refers to a fragmentation of conscious experience 
that either keeps apart ideas that belong together emotion-
ally or keeps apart ideas and the affects corresponding to 
them. The crucial connections between ideas or between 
ideas and feelings are buried. In final analysis, it appears 
that the idea is isolated from the threatening impulse of 
which it is a derivative.l2 
Be defines intellectualization as the 
••• retreat from the world of impulses and emotionally-
toned interpersonal relationships to a world principally 
of words and abstractions.l3 
It has an adaptive function, since it 
••• may also be a powerful aspect in the cultivation of 
one's intellectual potential, in creative and analytic 
thought, and in comprehension and mastery of the world 
around one. In addition, defensive intellectualization 
merges into adaptive, realistic, possibly conflict-free 
emphasis on intellect which is not at all defensive even 
though this emphasis may have originated in defensive 
conflict.l4 
An unresolved theoretical issue exists with respect to the 
question of whether or not a given individual employs only one 
class of defenses as a general response to stress, or develops 
specific defenses for specific conflicts. Although he never wrote 
about this matter in detail, Freud did state that, 
••• the ••• modes of defense~ •• may all be combined in the 
same person.l5 
12schafer, £2· ~., p. 336. 
l3Ibid.) p. 337. 
14Ibid., p. 337. 
lSs. Freud. The defense neuro-psyehoses. In Collected 
Papers. Vol. I. London: The Hogarth Press, 1948, p. 74. 
10 
Anna Freud) who makes the specificity-generality of defense issue 
explicit, wrote~ 
and 
••• one and the same ego can have at its disposal only a 
limited number of possible means of defense. At particular 
periods in life and according to its own specific structure 
the individual ego selects now one defense method now 
another ••• l6 
It is the same ego, and in all its conflicts it is more or 
less consistent in using every means which it has at its 
command.l7 
The considerations which determine the ego 1s choice of 
mechanisms remain uncertain. Perhaps repression is pre-
eminently of value in combatting sexual wishes) while other 
methods can more readily be employed against instinctual 
forces of a different kind, in particular, against aggres-
sive impulses. Or it may be that these other methods have 
only to complete what repression has left undone or to deal 
with such prohibited ideas as return to consciousness when 
repression fails. Or possibly each defense mechanism is 
first evolved in order to master some specific instinctual 
urge and so is associated with a particular phase of infantile 
development.l8 
The concept of defense preference, as employed in the present 
study, refers to the major class of defenses used by an individual 
and is not concerned with the question of whether or not other 
defenses are available to hiDl. 
16Anna Freud. ~ Ego ~ ~ Mechanisms .2£ Defense. 
London: The Hogarth Press, 1936, p. 34. 
17 Anna Freud, .22.. .E:!. , p. 35. 
l8Anna Freud, .22.· ill•, pp. 54-55. 
II. CLINICAL OBSERVATIONS RElATING THE DEFENSES 
TO DECISION MAKING 
Schafer has observed some characteristic decision making 
ll 
styles employed by individuals with repressive defense preferences. 
After studying their test-taking behavior~ he concludes that 
Moderate and flexible use of denial prevents getting bogged 
down in detail and contradictions, and it facilitates de-
cisiveness and smooth responsiveness •••• In exaggerated 
form, denial may be expressed in flightiness the patient 
not staying with any response long enough for its impor-
tance to be recognized, felt, and acknowledged. In true 
obsessional meticulousness all details are equally tm-
portant.l9 
Little has been written on the relations between the in-
tellectualized defenses per~ and decision making behaviour. How-
ever, numerous clinical reports of the behaviour of obsessive-
compulsive individuals are available in this regard. Since these 
individuals rely on intellectualized defenses, such observations 
are relevant. the often-observed decision making behaviour of the 
obsessive-compulsive individual is described by Cameron, when he 
writes, 
In some patients insistent doubts arise before every personally 
important decision can be made, and for the occasional 
patient, almost every move raises serious doubt. When the 
compulsive person is faced with a choice to be made, he may 
be assailed with unconquerable doubt concerning the rightness, 
wisdom, or feasibility of every possibility that presents 
itself. Whatever he does, he must know beforehand where it 
l9a. Schafer, .2E.· cit., p. 55. 
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leads, he must always choose the most right, the best, 
the surest, and the most complete alternative. Therefore, 
when the final decision looms ahead, the patient may have 
to suspend action while he mulls over every conceivable 
course and carries it through in fantasy to its possible 
outcome. But this procedure usually brings with it unex-
pected subsidiary choice-points and he may also have to go 
on to explore the potentialities of these alternatives also.20 
These observations suggest that, when confronted with the 
task of making a decision, repressive individuals tend to formulate 
few alternatives, whereas intellectualizers tend to formulate many. 
Furthermore, differences in the degree to which these two groups 
need to check out details are indicated from these clinical ob-
servations. 
We have seen that the repressive and intellectualized de-
fenses have different effects on consciousness. The model of 
perceptual decision making employed in this study allows us to 
relate the effects of the defenses on consciousness to the observed 
differences in decision making. This model borrows from the work 
of Bruner on perception. 
III. BRUNER1 S MODEL OF PERCEPTION 
Bruner's theoretical views on perception are succinctly 
stated in his paper entitled, QB Perceptual Readiness.2l In that 
paper, he describes perception as a process of categorization which 
involves inference. Thus, he states that perception may be viewed 
2~. Cameron and Ann Magaret. Behavior Pathology. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1951, pp. 301-302. 
21J. s. Bruner. On perceptual readiness. Psycbol. Rev., 
1957, 64, 123-152. 
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as a decision making process. The sequence of stages involved in 
this decision process are primitive categorization1 cue-search, 
confirmation cheCk1 and confirmation completion. These stages may 
be described in summary fashion as follows: 
(a} , Prtmitive Catesorization: In this initial stage, the stimulus 
emerges as figure against the background. It becomes percep-
tually isolated on the basis of its gestalt characteristics. 
This stage involves a rather passive reception process. 
(b) Cue Search: This second phase is characterized by a global 
search for informationcrwith which to formulate a set of 
alternative hypotheses about what the stimulus could be. 
(c) Confirmation Check: The individual now focuses his in-
formational search on details that might prove relevant for 
establishing the subjective validity of his alternative 
hypotheses. 
(d) Confirmation Completion: In this final stage, the per-
ceptual decision is made. The individual no longer is 
receptive to additional information and the search for cues 
comes to an end. 
These stages of perceptual decision making are considered 
by Bruner to be very similar to the inferences involved in the 
more conceptual kind of activity. The stages are not necessarily 
conscious or deliberate. He does not specify whether or not the 
alternative hypotheses formulated by the individual are conscious. 
The decision making model employed in the present study, however, 
deals only with those alternative hypotheses which are conscious 
and verbalizable. 
Bruner makes some suggestions regarding the neurophysio-
logical events which underlie the perceptual decision making 
process. These are not within the scope of the present research. 
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What is relevant, however, is his discussion of some observed in· 
dividual differences in the amount of cue search required for a 
final decision. He reports that individuals vary considerably with 
regard to the number of alternative hypotheses that they formulate 
when faced with the task of making a perceptual decision. People 
who are attuned to a narrow array of alternatives, when faced 
with stimuli of high probability, do well and make their percep-
tual. decisions with a minimum of perceptual search. Unexpected 
stimuli, such as taboo or threatening material, lead to dela7ed 
perceptual decision making in such individuals, however. Some 
individuals typically formulate a wide variety of alternative 
hypotheses when attempting a perceptual decision. ~hey must 
undertake a great deal of informational search in order to check 
out the stimu~us for a large number of things that it 'could be.• 
Bruner indicates tbat.there is much need for further research 
into the relationships between personality variables and percep-
tual decision making. 
IV. STRESS AS AN ACTIVATOR OF DEFENSE 
Fenichel22 lists anxiety, guilt feelings, disgust, and 
shame as the motives of defense. However, both he and Freud23 
22o. Fenichel. ~he Psychoanalytic Theory ~ the Neurosis. 
New York: w. W. Norton and Co., 1945. 
23s. Freud. ~he Problem of Anxiety. New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., 1936:--
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before h~ indicate that it is actually anxiety which is the basic 
activator of defense. These other defense-evoking emotions are 
specialized forms of anxiety. The key theoretical relationship 
between anxiety and defense is explained by Fenichel, when he 
writes, 
The primary anxiety, · or the first anxiety out of which 
later anxiety develops, is a manifestation of unmastered 
tension. It is an automatic occurrence that takes place 
whenever the organism is flooded with excitement; the 
symptoms of the traumatic neurosis show that it is not 
ltmited to infancy. This primary or traumatic anxiety 
occurs automatically, makes its appearance as panic, and 
is experienced by the ego passively; it can be understood 
partly as the way in which the unmastered tension makes 
itself felt and partly as an expression of vegetative 
emergency discharges. Later on, the ego learns to use 
previously automatic arahaic reactions for its purposes. 
The ego • s judgment of impending danger brings the organism 
into a state similar to that of a trauma, but of lower in-
tensity. .The tttamed anxiety, tt thus developed by the ego 
in the case of danger, may be called an anxiety signal, 
for it is used to indicate the necessity for starting 
defensive action. That component of anxiety appropriate 
to danger situations, preparation for defense, arises 
fram the fact that .:i-t-4s- -the. ego that uses anxiety; what 
is inappropriate, the fact that anxiety sometimes bloCks 
the pertinent attitude, is due to the circumstance that 
the ego has no other material at hand than an archaic 
automatic mechanism..24 
These remarks suggest that situations which lead to anxiety 
result in increased defensiveness. Such situations are charac-
terized by what has come to be referred to as psychological 
stress •. 'For instance, Lazarus and. Baker write that, 
24renichel, ~· cit., pp. 132·133. 
Psychological stress occurs when a situation is perceived 
as thwarting or as potentially thwarting to some motive 
state, thus resulting in affective arousal and in the 
elicitation of regulative processes aimed at the manage• 
ment of affect.25 
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Response to stress is related to the nature and efficiency 
of the individual•s defenses. Although the specificity-generality 
of defense issue does exist, certain evidence would tend to support 
an assumption that the particular modes of defense evoked by stress 
are a function of the individual's defense preference. That is, 
while it is possible for an individual to have a variety of de-
fenses at his command, only a few of these are employed with much 
frequency.26, 27, 28, 29 
V. RELATED STUDIES 
Among the earliest studies relating personality variables 
to perceptual performance was the work of Frenkel-Brunswik on 
25a. w. Lazarus and R. W. Baker. Personality and Psycho-
logical stress; A theoretical and methodological framework. 
Psychol. Newsletter, 1956, ~, 21-32. 
26J. Deese and R. s. Lazarus. 
Stress on Performance: A Theoretical 
Uni v. , sept. 19 53 (mimeo) • 
The Effects of Psychological 
Framework. The Johns Hopkins 
27o. H. Mowrer. A stimulus response analysis of anxiety and 
its role as a reinforcing agent. Psychol. !!!·' 1939, ~' 553-565. 
28a. s. Lazarus and N. Longo. The consistency of psycho-
logical defenses against threat. :J... abn. ~· Psychol. 1953, 48, 
495-499. 
29a. )L Collier. Consciousness as 4 regulatory field: A 
theory of psychopathology. Psychol. ~., 1956, 63, 360-369. 
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niutolerance of ambiguity. n30 She hypothesized that ambivalence 
towards parents, who are experienced as too threatening and powerful, 
leads to a stereotyped perceptual approach which is characterized 
by rigidity and blaCk-white dichotomizing. This perceptual approach 
is referred to as "intolerance of ambiguity. n It is related to a 
tendency towards escaping into whatever appears definite and safe 
rather than to think in terms of probabilities. Compulsive indi-
viduals, with their reliance on defensive isolation, might well 
exhibit intolerance of amhiguity1 according to Frenkel-Brunswik. 
Her studies indicate a relationship between ethnocentrism, which 
can be viewed as au intolerance of nsocial ambiguity," and intol-
erance of ambiguity in a perceptual decision making situation. 
Following Frenkel-Brunswik•s lead, Rosenberg3l hypothesized 
that compulsive neurotics> when presented with ambiguous stimuli, 
will make greater systematic errors in the direction of symmetry 
and closure than will normal individuals. His results were in 
keeping with his predictbns, although statistical significance 
was not obtained on his closure response data. 
Block and Peterson32 compared subjects' performance on a 
3~lse Frenkel-Brunswik. Intolerance of ambiguity as au 
emotional and perceptual variable. l· ~·, 1949, ]&, 108-143. 
31B. G. Rosenberg. Compulsiveness as a deter.minant in selec-
ted cognitive perceptual performance. l· ~., 1953, 21, 506-516. 
32J. Block and P. Peterson. Some personality correlates of 
confidence, caution, and speed in a decision situation. l• !.'!?!!.· ..!2.£• 
Psychol., 1955, 2!, 34-41. 
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psychophysical judgment task with personality ratings made by the 
subjects themselves and by observers. Their results suggest that 
those individuals who were overly confident in their judgments 
ten4ed to be rated as exhibiting behavior that could be described 
as repressive. On the other hand~ those who were ove~ly cautious 
in their judgments were rated as exhibiting traits that suggest 
an intellectualized defensive structure. 
Binder33 attempted to study the personality correlates of 
the ntendency to respond early in the process of cue accumulation, 
before unambiguous specification is possible.u He predicted that 
early responding would be associated with repressive tendencies, 
whereas delayed responding would be associated with intellectualized 
and paranoid tendencies, as measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory. His data weEe inconclusive regarding the 
relationships between perceptual responding and the repressive 
and intellectualized tendencies, but supported the predicted rela-
tionship with the paranoid measure. Binder's choice of the M.M.P.I. 
as his defense measure may be a major factor in his laCk of signi-
ficant results. A defense measure that is less complicated by 
the factors of anxiety~ degree of pathology, suppression, and 
social desirability than the M.M.P.I. might have provided htm with 
"purer'• defense groups. 
33A. Binder. Personality variables and recognition response 
level, J. abn • .!2£• Psychol., 1958, 57, 136-142. 
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Eriksen and Eisenstein34 hypothesized that repression, which 
restricts consciousness, should also lead to a reduction in the 
number of alternatives foxmulated on perceptual and cognitive 
tasks involving inference. In their experiment, they found that 
the number of Rorschach percepts rejected on the MaCReynolds Con-
cept Evaluation Technique was negatively correlated with a measure 
of hypothesis availability, (the number of different responses 
given to stimuli presented tachistoscopically), and positively 
related to both the degree of ri8idity exhibited on a Luchins 
Water Jug task and the extent of adherence to erroneous expec-
tancies in a tachistoscopic recognition task. The authors conclude 
that repression reduces the number of alternatives formulated and 
accounts for much of the observed rigidity in perceptual and cog-
nitive performances. 
Belmont and Birch35 were among the first investigators 
to demonstrate experimentally that hyperalertness, as well as 
repression, can be evoked by stress. They compared subjects' 
learning efficiency for words paired with electric shock with 
words not paired with electric shock. Thirty-eight of their sub-
jects learned the shocked words more quickly than the non-shocked 
34c. Eriksen and D. Eisenstein. Personality rigidity and 
the Rorschach., :!· ~·, 1953, 21, 386-391. 
3~illian Belmont and H. G. Birch. Re-individualizing 
the repression hypothesis. J. !£a• ~· Psycho!., 1951, ~' 
471-482. 
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words. Nineteen subjects learned the non-shoCked words more quiCkly 
than the shocked words. They conclude that repression is the pre-
£erred defense for some people, but not so for others. 
Many of the uperceptual defensen studies are related to 
the present study. However, only a few of these need be mentioned. 
Lazarus, Eriksen, and Fonda36 studied the relationship of repres-
sive and intellectualized defense preferences to auditory recogni-
tion thresholds. They predicted that repressive individuals, as 
judged by psychiatric diagnosis and sentence-completion test per-
formance, would have high recognition thresholds for threatening 
material. Intellectualization, in contrast, was expected to be 
associated with low recognition thresholds for threatening material. 
Their results confirmed their predictions. They found that the 
individual tended to be consistent in performance across the two 
conflict areas of sex and aggression. 
Carpenter, Wiener and Carpenter,37 using the multi-carbon 
method of presenting visual recognition material, found that re-
pressive defenses, as measured by a sentence-completion method, 
were associated with high recognition thresholds, whereas sen-
sitizing or 11alertnessu defenses (intellectualized defenses, in 
our terminology) were associated with low thresholds. Unlike 
Lazarus, Eriksen and Fonda, they found that there was not much 
36a. s. Lazarus, c. W. Eriksen, and c. P. Fonda. Person-
ality dynamics and auditory perceptual recognition. i!..· ~·, 
1951, 19, 471-482. 
37B. Carpenter, M. Wiener, and Janeth Carpenter. Predic-
tability of perceptual defense behavior., i!..· abn • .!2.£• J!sychol., 
1956, ~, 380-383. 
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consistency in the individual r s defense-pref_erence across the two 
conflict areas of sex and hostility. 
Kurland~38 too, found that subjects were not consistent in 
their defense-preferences. In addition, his data did not support 
the notion of a relationship between defense and auditory perception. 
Bruner39 attempts to bring perceptual defense within the 
reabn of general perceptual processes, rather than to consider 
it as a special ttmechanism. n He claims that the phenomena labeled 
as perceptual defense are reducible to the general laws determining · 
the amount of information needed to confirm an hypothesis. The 
more personally relevant the hypothesis, the stronger it is, and, 
consequently, the less information is needed for its confirmation. 
A more recent approach to the relationship between psycho-
logical defense and perceptual behavior is found in the work of 
Holzman and Gardner40 and Gardner ~!1.41 They studied there-
38s. H. Kurland. The lack of generality in defense mechan-
isms as indicated in auditory perception. i!· abn. soc. Psychol., 
1954, ~' 173-177. 
39J. s. Bruner, Personality dynamics and the process of 
perce1V1ng. In Perception: ~Approach~ Personality. (R. Blake 
and G. Ramsey, eds.). New York: Ronald Press, 1951. 
40p. s. Holzman and R. W. Gardner. Leveling and repression. 
i!· ~· ~· Psychol., 1959, 59, 151-155. 
41R. Gardner, P. s. Holzman, G. s. Klein, Harriet Linton, 
and D. P. Spence. Cognitive Control. Psychol. Issues, Vol. I, 
No. 4~ 1959. 
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lationships of repression and intellectualization to certain con-
ceptual approaches which they call "cognitive controls.u Cognitive 
controls are the adaptive cognitive aspects of the mechanisms of 
defense. Their studies have shown that individuals who utilize 
repression as a major defense tend to exhibit the cognitive control 
called nleveling.n Such individuals have memory organizations 
which are characterized by a lack of distinct individual elements. 
As a result, they tend to be unaware of size and weight changes 
when presented with series of stimuli for successive comparison. 
Intellectualizers were found to exhibit the cognitive control 
called "scanning." Such individuals are characterized by their 
deployment of attention to relatively many aspects of stimulus 
fields. 
Studies Relating Stress and Complex Performance 
Because of their importance in personality theory and clin-
ical psychopathology, the variables of anxiety and stress have been 
extensively treated in psychological experiments. As much of this 
work has been reviewed elsewhere, 42 ' 43 only a few of the most 
relevant studies need be mentioned. 
42Eugenia Banfman. 
of anxiety. In Anxiety. 
Grune & Stratton, 1950. 
Psychological approaches to the study 
(P. Hoch and J. Zubin, eds.). New York; 
43a. Mandler. Anxiety and Performance: Empirical and Theo-
retical Aspects of Anxiety Scales. ~· .2£ ~._!!!., ~rvard--univ. 
(mtmeo). 
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Fostman and Bruner,44 in a tachistoscopic recognition ex-
pertment, utilized abusive criticism and a frustrating perceptual 
task to produce stress in some of their subjects. When compared 
with a control group, the stressed group had higher recognition 
thresholds, a lessened ability to discriminate between sense and 
nonsense, gave more aggressive and escape interpretations of the 
stimuli, and fixated prematurely on erroneous hypotheses. These 
behaviors led Fostman and Bruner to conclude that perception 
undergoes a primitivization under stress. 
Using a similar design, Smock,45 who employed ambiguous 
stimuli, found that stress resulted in premature erroneous re-
spending and delayed veridical responding. He concluded that 
much of the behavior labeled as ttintolerance of ambiguity" can 
be attributed to the effects of anxiety and stress. 
Cowen46 studied the performance of individuals on the 
Luchins 1 Water Jar task. He employed a control group and two 
groups subjected to differing levels of stress. His results 
44t. Fostman and J. s. Bruner. Ferception under stress. 
Fsychol. !!!•, 1948, 55,.. ... 314-323. 
45c. D. Smock. The influence of psychological stress on 
"intolerance of ambiguity." J.. ~· .!2£· Fsychol., 1955, ,2_Q, 
177-182. 
46p;. L. Cowen. The influence of varying degrees of 
psychological stress on problem solving rigidity. l• ~· !2£• 
Fsychol., 1952, ~~ 512-519. 
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showed that "rigidity" increased as a function of stress. Rigidity 
was measured by the number of rigid solutions, response time, and 
ease of set-extinction on the Luchins task. 
VI. SUMMARY 
According to psychoanalytic theory, a defense is any 
psychological process which an individual employs to prevent 
expression of threatening impulses in order to avoid the painful 
consequences of such expression. Adaptive coping with life requires 
the successful use of defenses. Although defenses are potentially 
dangerous insofar as exaggerated employment of them is one defi-
nition of a pathological solution of conflict, they are not 
inherently destructive. It is the failure of defenses, and not 
their mere presence, which is associated with psychopathology. 
The repressive class of defenses includes repression. 
which deals with disturbing instinctual demand~, and denial, 
which is aimed at threatening external stimuli. Both of these 
repressive defenses serve to restrict conscious ideation. The 
intellectualized class of defenses includes isolation, which 
serves to remove the emotional significance of impulses, and 
intellectualization, which represents the translation of instinct 
into cognitive terms. These intellectualized defenses promote 
conscious ideation. 
Clinical observations suggest that repressive individuals, 
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when confronted with the task of making a decision, tend to for-
mulate few alternative hypotheses, whereas intellectualizers tend 
to formulate many. Furthermore, repressors apparently require a 
less careful scrutiny of a stimulus in order to arrive at a per-
ceptual decision than do intellectualizers. Bruner's approach 
to perception provides a framework in which to study these aspects 
of perceptual decision making. 
Situations which lead to anxiety result in increased de-
fensiveness. Response to stress is related to the nature and 
efficiency of the individual's .defenses~ Certain defenses, e.g. 
repressive or intellectualized, come to have the highest positions 
in a person's hierarchy of responses to stress. There is evidence 
to suggest that, as the degree of stress in a situation increases, 
reliance on, and the effects of, the preferred defenses increases. 
Several studies involving the relationships of personality 
variables and psychological stress to complex mental performance 
were discussed. The experimental evidence suggests that defense 
preference and degree of stress are important determinant~ of 
perceptual decision making behavior. 
---~- ----
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND IIYFOTHESES 
Individuals vary widely in the manner with which they 
approach problems of inference. Psychoanalytic theory and clin• 
ical observations have suggested that the type of psychological 
defense employed by an individual is a determinant of his decision 
making behavior. The present study attempted to investigate the 
relationships of repressive and intellectualized defense prefer-
ences to (l) the number of alternative hypotheses formulated and 
(2) the amount of cue search required for a final perceptual de-
cision under two different levels of psychological stress. 
The theoretical basis for these relationships revolved 
around the differential effects of the repressive and intellec-
tualized defenses on conscious ideation. A model of perceptual 
decision making was employed for studying the role of psychologi-
cal defense as a determinant of decision making behavior. 
I. THE MODEL OF PERCEPTUAL DECISION MAKING 
This propositional model describes some of the processes 
at work within an individual who is confronted with the task of 
making a final decision regarding the nature of a stimulus. 
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(a} The individual scans the available stimulus information 
and formulates a set of alternate hypotheses. These 
alternative hypotheses are equivalent to conscious ideas. 
(b) The individual searches for cues with Which to infirm 
or confirm his alternative hypotheses. Each such hy-
pothesis, or idea, requires a certain amount of cue 
search before it can be infirmed or confirmed. (This 
phase corresponds to Bruner's cue search and confirma-
tion cheCk stages). 
(c) The individual reaches a final perceptual decision once 
he has carried out the required amount of cue search 
for rejecting all of his alternative hypotheses except 
for one. 
The following propositions were derived from the theoretical 
background of the study. Some of these propositions served as the 
basis for the formal hypotheses that were tested in this research. 
II.- PROPOSITIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
According to the model of perceptual decision making, 
i. Each alternative hypothesis requires a certain amount of cue 
search before it can be infirmed or confirmed. 
and 
ii. All alternative hypotheses must be infirmed or confirmed 
(i.e. "cheCked out0 ) before a final perceptual decision 
is made. 
Therefore, 
HyPothesis I. In a perceptual decision making situation, the 
amount of cue search required for a final decision 
is a function of the number of alternate hypotheses 
formulated. 
Since alternative hypotheses are equivalent to conscious ideas, 
iii. The number of alternative hypotheses formulated is a function 
of the degree of conscious ideation. 
----- ---·---~---
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By definition, 
iv. Repressive defenses restrict conscious ideation 
and 
v. Intellectualized defenses increase conscious ideation. 
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2. In a perceptual decision making situation, repres-
sive defenses restrict the number of alternative 
hypotheses formulated. 
and 
Hypothesis 3. In a perceptual decision making situation, intel-
lectualized defenses increase the number of alterna-
tive hypotheses formulated. 
Recalling the relationship between amount of cue search and alterna-
tive hypotheses, it follows that 
Hypothesis 4. In a perceptual decision making situation, repres• 
sive defenses restrict the amount of cue search 
required for a final decision. 
and 
Hypothesis 5. In a perceptual decision making situation, intel-
lectualized defenses increase the amount of cue 
search required for a final decision. 
vi. As stress increases, use of the preferred defenses increases. 
Recalling the relationship between the defenses and the number of 
alternative hypotheses formulated, it follows that 
Hypothesis 6. As st»ess is increased in a perceptual decision 
making situation, the number of alternative hy-
potheses formulated is reduced as a function of 
repressive defenses. 
and 
Hypothesis 7. As stress is increased in a perceptual decision 
making situation, the number of alternative hy-
potheses formulated is raised as a function of 
intellectualized defenses. 
Recalling the relationship between amount of cue search and al-
ternative hypotheses, it follows that 
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Hypothesis 8. As stress is increased in a perceptual decision 
making situation, the amount of cue search required 
for a final decision is reduced as a function of 
repressive defenses. 
~d 
Hypothesis 9. As stress is increased in a perceptual decision 
making situation, the amount of cue search re-
quired for a final decision is raised as a function 
of intellectualized defenses. 
CHA.PTER IV 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND PROCEDURES 
The experiment was designed to permit the study of the 
inter-relationships among the four variables under considera-
tion. The two independent variables were defense preferences 
and degree o.f stress associated with a perceptual decision 
making situation. The two dependent variables were the number 
of alternative hypotheses formulated and the amount of cue 
search required for a .final perceptual decision. 
I. THE SUBJECTS 
Two hundred twenty-four men and women enrolled in under-
graduate courses in psychology, anthropology, and sociology at 
Boston University served as the screening subjects. They were 
administered a sentence-completion test which served as the 
defense measure. Some o.f the subjects took the test in class, 
while others .did so on a "take home" basis. Participation 
was voluntary. The subjects were told that a number o.f them 
would be asked to participate further in an experiment in-
volving visual perception. It was explained that this latter 
experiment would take ]tP less than an hour o.f their time and 
that they would be paid $1.50. 
--- ---------~-----
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II. THE DEFENSE MEASURE 
The sentence-completion test which served as the defense 
measure was a modified version of the test designed and employed 
by Wiener, Carpenter, and Carpenter.l,2 The version of the test 
used contained the twenty stems used by Wiener, Carpenter, and 
Carpenter3 plus five additional items. The directions and sen-
tence stems of which this test was composed read as follows: 
DIRECTIONS: 
Complete these sentences to express your real feelings. 
Try to do every one. Be sure to make a complete sentence. 
1. Sports are 10. Walking 19. The birds 
2. I don't want to know 11. Dating 20. Deep down I 
3. Dancing 12. People who neck 21. Killing 
4. Reading is 13. It bothers me 22. Parties 
5. I failed 14. I get mad 23. War 
6. There are 15. I really feel 24. I fear 
7. I resent 16. Men and women 25. What worries 
8. I hate 17. What annoys me me is 
9. sex is 18. I secretly 
The sentence-completion tests were scored according to 
the criteria used by Wiener, Carpenter, and Carpenter. In the 
~. Wiener, B. Carpenter, and Janeth T. Carpenter. Deter-
mination of defense mechanisms for conflict areas from verbal 
material. l· consult. Psychol., 1956, ~' 215-219. 
2B. Carpenter, M. Wiener, and Janeth T. Carpenter. 
dictabi1ity of perceptual defense behavior. l· abn. ~· 
1956, 52, 380-385. 
3Ibid. 
Pre-
Psycho!., 
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present study, however, the term "Intellectualized,. was used to 
designate that class of responses which those authors labeled 
as "Sensitizing." These scoring criteria, along with some illus-
trative responses appearing in brackets, follows: 
A. Responses fitting into the following categories were scored 
as intellectualizing: 
1. Statement of inadequacy or failure. (!really feel I am no good.) 
2. Rationalization. (! failed my German exam, but only because I 
was tired.) 
3. Intellectualization. ~ bothers ~ to read in the papers that 
the Communists have taken over another 
country.) 
4. Acting, then undoing and inhibiting. a ~ my brother I but only 
when he fights with me.) 
5. Displacement of projection. ~ bothers !! to hear people making 
fun of another's handicap.) 
6. Preoccupation, including elicitation of a conflictual response 
by a stimulus which is inappropriate for that particular content 
area. (!~to see two girls holding bands.) 
7. Projection of motives or feelings to other. (!hate people !?.!!2, de-
liberately hurt others.) 
8. Use of humor with conflictual material. (Sex is something I know 
nothing about--I'm too 
innocent.) 
9. Qualification. (People !!!!2, ~ are all right, if they don't do 
it too much.) 
10. Overreaction to stimulus. (!~people.) 
11. Denial of importance. (Sex is overemphasized in our society today.) 
B. Responses fitting into the following categories were scores as 
Repressive: 
1. The use of cliches. (!~war; ~.!! here to stay.) 
2. Denial of stimulus implication. (!~nobody.) 
3. Avoidance of stimulus. (! ~ asparagus.) 
4. Blocking. (no response.) 
5. Distancing from. personal involvement. (!~to think of how cold 
it is in Iceland.) 
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6. Very limited generalizations. ~ bothers ~ when someone pops 
gum in my ear.) 
7. Minimization of involvement in the conflictual activity. (Sex !.! 
something I won't know about until I'm married.) 
8. Obligations, duty, imposed acceptibility by authority. (Dancing 
!.! something young people should learn.) 
9. Definitions which lead to avoidance of the conflictual connota-
tions of the stimulus. (Dancing!!, the movement of one's feet.) 
10. Moralization, romanticization, naivete, or idealization. 
(Sex is one of the gifts of God that is to be used and enjoyed 
as he wishes.) 
c. Responses not fitting into the above categories were scored as 
Neither. 
Carpenter, Wiener, and Carpenter4 correlated performance 
on this test with visual recognition thresholds. They found that 
repressive responses to a given conflict area (sex, hostility, or 
adequacy) were associated with "perceptual defense11 in that same 
area. Similarly, sensitizing responses (Intellectualizing, in 
our terminology) went along with nperceptual vigilance. 11 These 
relationships were statistically significant. 
ln order to measure the inter-rater scoring reliability of 
this test, Wiener, Carpenter, and CarpenterS had four clinical 
psychologists independently score responses to 2100 critical 
stems. On 72 per cent of the items, at least three of the four 
judges were in agreement. On the remaining 28 per cent of the 
responses, there was lesser agreement among judges. The authors 
4carpenter et. al., .2£• ,ill_. 
Swiener et. al. , .2£. £!:!. 
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conclude that this level of reliability is adequate for many re-
search problems, although a higher level of reliability would be 
desirable if the test were to serve as a clinical tool. 
In order to obtain a unidimensional distribution of scores, 
the following system was employed: 
(a) Each intellectualized response was given a score of two points. 
(b) Each response scored as Neither was given a score of one point,, 
~d 
' (c) Each Repressive response was scored as zero. 
The sentence-completion score for each subject was obtained by 
summing up the total number of points on all twenty-five items. 
Thus, the possible r~ge of scores was from zero to fifty points. 
The obtained distribution of sentence-completion scores of 
the screening subjects is given in Table I. The scores ranged 
from ll to 38 points. The me~ score was 24.03 points ~d the 
median was 23.14 points. The standard deviation was 4.77 points. 
The reliability of the sentence-completion test was com-
puted by the split half method and corrected by the Spearman 
Brown Prophesy Formula. In order to compare two sets of test 
items of equal size and comparable content area, items 2,3,4,5,7, 
10,11,13,16,17,20, and 25, were compared with items 6,8,9,12,14, 
15,18,19,21,22,23 ~d 24. The computation was based on fifty 
cases selected at random from the total 224. This yielded a 
reliability coefficient of .81. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCE-COMPLETION SCORES 
OF TBE SCREENING SUBJECTS 
SCORE 
Mean • 24.03 
Median • 23.14 
S.D. • 4.77 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
FREQUENCY 
1 
0 
1 
1 
3 
1 
10 
7 
11 
22 
20 
12 
22 
12 
19 
21 
ll 
6 
5 
15 
8 
8 
4 
1 
1 
0 
1 
l 
N: 224 
35 
36 
III. THE DEFENSE GROUPS 
Thirty subjects who scored 20 points or less on the sen-
tence-completion test served as the Repressor group. The Intellec-
tualizer group consisted of thirty subjects whose sentence-completion 
scores were 30 points or more. Since the standard deviation of the 
distribution of sentence-completion scores was 4.77, the two cut-
off points of 20 and 30 points used in selecting the defense groups 
lie more than two standard deviations apart. Therefore, if the 
obtained distribution of scores is representative of the universe 
of scores on this test, these cut-off points can be employed in 
the future for selecting two groups of subjects whose mean scores 
are significantly different. 
A comparison of the groups as to number of men and women, 
years of college completed, and college grade-point average ap-
pears in Table II. There were no significant differences between 
the two groups on any of these measures. 
Each member of both defense groups was then individually 
administered the perceptual decision making test. 7he remaining 
164 screening subjects did not take further part in the experiment. 
IV. THE DECISION MAKING TEST 
The decision making test was administered in a small 
laboratory cubicle with standard room illumination and sound-
------
37 
reduced walls. The subject was seated facing the apparatus which 
was placed at eye level at a distance of about three and one-half 
feet. The examiner was seated behind the apparatus. Subjects 
varied considerably in the amount of time which they spent on the 
test, since they were allowed to pro~eed at their own pace. The 
length of time spent on the task ranged from 20 to 7 5 minutes and 
averaged about 50 minutes. 
A. Test Stimuli: A set of nine pictures, one of which 
served only for demonstration purposes, was employed. These were 
crude drawings of objects done with blue ball-point pen on white 
cardboards. The cardboards were 12.5u high and 8" wide. The 
drawings were all 12.5u high but varied in width. The objects 
depicted were an umbrella (the demonstration picture), a snake, a 
watch on a chain~ a boot, a hammer, a pencil, a pipe, a golf club, 
and a ladle. All of the objects were pictured in a vertical posi-
tion. (See Appendix A for photographs of these pictures.) 
B. Apparatus and Method of Presenting the Test Stimuli: 
Each picture, when presented for viewing, was mounted on a 
specially-constructed piece of equipment. This apparatus, which 
is illustrated in Figure l, had the following essential parts: 
(1) a stationary frame on which the picture was mounted, (2) a 
movable sheet-metal blind which was placed in front of the picture, 
and (3) a measuring scale marked off in 50 quarter-inch intervals 
mounted in back of the picture. This scale was placed so that it 
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TABLE II 
A COMPARISON OF THE DEFENSE GROUPS AS TO NUMBER 
OF MEN AND WOMEN, YEARS OF COLLEGE COMPLETED, 
AND GRADE-POINT AVERAGE 
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REPRESSORS INTELLECTUALIZERS 
Ratio of Men:Women 14:16 16:14 
Age Range 18-44 18-45 
Mees.Age 22.73 23.23 
Mean Years of College Completed 2.32 2.86 
Mean College Grade-Point Averagel 2.35 2.84 
~he grade-point average was arrived at by assigning 0 
points for F-grades, l point for D•grades, 2 points for C-grades, 
3 points for B•grades and 4 points for A-grades. 
permitted the examiner to measure off exactly the number of 
quarter-inch steps that the blind was lowered. 
By turning a crank-handle which lowered the blind, the 
examiner exposed the picture in descending cumulative quarter-
inch horizontal segments (each such cumulative quarter-inch is 
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referred to hereafter as a trial). As many trials were presented 
as were necessary for the subject to arrive at a final decision as 
to what the picture represented. 
c. Instructions: The subject was read the following set 
of instructions, while the examiner presented them orally: 
DIRECTIONS 
You will be shown a series of pictures presented one at 
a time. At first you will be sho~ just a very small 
portion of the picture area. Then, step by step, you 
will be shown more and more of the picture. 
Your job consists of doing two things--namely, (1) to 
tell me all of the things that the picture reminds you 
of, and (2) when you have seen enough of the picture 
to do so, to make a final decision as to what the pic-
ture represents. 
Each time you are shown a little more of the picture, 
you are to tell me what it reminds you of. Then you 
will be shown a little more of the picture. Once you 
have made your final decision as to what the picture 
represents (and please be sure to tell me when you have 
made your final decision), you will be shown no more of 
the picture. We will then go on to the next picture in 
the series. 
To get a good score on this test, you must try to do 
two things: 
(1) Try to make your final decisions accurate ones, and 
l 
FIGURE 1 
TBE PERCEPTUAL DECISION MAKING TEST APPARAXUS 
1
crank handle turned by the examiner to lower the blind 
and reveal the picture. 
2..rest picture. 
3vertically-sliding sheet-metal blind. 
40 
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(2) Try to make your final decisions with as little of the 
picture showing as possible. 
We will now run through a practice picture to help you get 
acquainted with the task. If you have any questions about 
these directions, please feel free to ask them now. 
After the instructions were read and the subject's questions 
were answered, the demonstration picture was mounted on the appa-
ratus. The examiner then exposed this picture in cumulative 
quarter-inch horizontal segments and repeated relevant parts of 
the instructions as he did so. It was then announced that the 
next picture would be the first one of the test series. 
D. Scoring; The subject received an Alternative Hypoth-
eses score and a Cue Search score for his performance on each of 
the eight test pictures. The Alternative Hypotheses score con-
sisted of the number of different npossibilities" (including the 
one finally decided upon) reported. The Cue Search score con-
sisted of the number of trials taken before the final decision 
was made. Each subject was given a total Alternative Hypotheses 
score and a Total Cue Search score. These consisted of the total 
of the subscores for all eight pictures. In addition, each sub-
ject received separate scores for each of the two stress conditions. 
V. THE STRESS CONDITIONS 
Each subject was presented with the first four pictures 
of the perceptual decision making test under the Low Stress con• 
dition and the last four pictures under the High Stress condition. 
------- --- ---
-------
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The serial order of picture-presentation was randomly distributed 
across defense groups and stress conditions. 
The Low Stress condition, under which the first four pic-
tures were presented, was structured by the non-threatening, 
friendly atmosphere which the examiner attempted to create prior 
to the introduction of the test instructions. 
The High Stress condition was defined by the harsh and 
ambiguous criticism of the subject made by the examiner immediately 
prior to the presentation of the fifth picture. Within the limits 
imposed by the need for a flexible, "convincing" delivery, these 
criticisms were very similar for all subjects. A typical criti-
cism ran as follows: 
Tell me, do you find this task very nerve-wracking? 
(The subject usually said that he was not upset by the 
task but rapidly began to show signs of anxiety as the 
criticism progressed) ••••••••• You look sort of upset 
••••••••• Listen, don't be ashamed to admit it ••••••••• 
if this test is too much for you, we can stop right now 
••••••••• don't worry about the money ••••••••• you'll get 
paid the entire amount even if you don't finish the rest 
of the test. (By now, the subject, speaking rapidly and 
anxiously, would begin to beg the examiner to continue 
with the test.) Well ••••••••• ~ don't know ••••••••• you 
.haven't been doing well and you look kind of nervous 
••••••••• Is there anything special bothering you today? 
••••••••• OK, we~l go on, but you sure look kind of 
upset. You've really been doing a pretty poor job 
••••••••• (Often, the subject would now ask the examiner 
to be more specific about the lack in the subject's per• 
formance. The examiner ignored these questions and went 
right on with the test.) 
In order to reduce the stress as quickly as possible, the 
subject was given a verbal explanation about the purpose of the 
- -- -- ----- ----
--·-- ----- ----· 
·- ------. ------. 
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criticism as soon as he was through responding to the eighth pic-
ture. In addition~ to further impress the subject with the "phony" 
nature of the criticism, .he was given a card to read on which the 
following was typewritten: 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH •••••..••..•••••••••••••••.•••••••••• 
Now that the experiment is over, you can be told that the 
experimenter purposely tried to create stress by criticizing 
your performance. This criticism was a 11built-inn part of 
the experiment and did not actually represent an evaluation 
of your performance. In other words, everyone who takes part 
in this experiment receives the same criticism. This was 
done to study people's reaction to stress. 
Please excuse us if you had a few unpleasant moments as 
the result of this false criticism ••• it was carried out 
in the name of science. 
'l:hank you again, 
(Examiner's name) 
In every case, after a brief period of further explanation, 
the subject appeared relaxed and fully aware that the criticism 
he had received was artificial. 
CHAPTER V 
PREDICTIONS AND RESU~S 
The decision making test data were arranged into nine 
basic distributions of scores for the Alternative Hypotheses 
measure and nine for the Cue Search measure. These consisted 
of the scores of the Repressor group, Intellectualizer group, and 
combined groups under the Low, High, and Total stress conditions. 
The predictions tested in this study involved comparisons among 
these various distributions of scores. 
I. TBE PREDICTIONS 
The first hypothesis stated, 
In a perceptual decision making situation, the amount 
of cue search required for a final decision is a func-
tion of the number of alternative hypotheses formulated. 
When this hypothesis was translated into the terms of the experi-
mental operations, we arrived at 
Prediction No. l. When the scores of all subjects are 
pooled, the Total Cue Search scores will be positively correlated 
with the Total Alternative Hypotheses scores. 
The Alternative Hypotheses scores and the Cue Search 
scores for all sixty subjects were correlated. The obtained 
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Pearson Product-Moment Correlational were .33 for Total scores, 
.29 for Low Stress scores, and .34 for the High Stress scores. 
These correlations, although small, were significant at the.Ol, 
.05, and.Ol levels, respectively. These results, therefore, con-
firmed the first prediction. 
and 
The second and third hypotheses, respectively, stated that 
In a perceptual decision making situation, repressive 
defenses restrict the number of alternative hypotheses 
formulated 
In a perceptual decision making situation, intellectualized 
defenses increase the number of alternative hypotheses 
formulated. 
When these hypotheses were combined and translated into the terms 
of the experimental operations, we arrived at 
Prediction No. 2. The Repressor group will have lower 
Total Alternative Hypotheses scores than the Intellectualizer group. 
Table III lists the means and medians for each defense group 
for the Total Alternative Hypotheses measure. The Intellectualizer 
group•s distribution was considerably more variable and skewed than 
that of the Repressor group. Since these scores did not warrant 
the application of parametric statistics, the Mann-Whitney. 
lq. McNemar. Psychological Statistics (2nd ed.). New York: 
. Wiley, 1955. 
TABLE III 
THE PERCEPTUAL DECISION MAKING 
TEST MEASURES: 
MEAN AND MEDIAN SCORES FOR DEFENSE GROUPS AND STRESS 
CONDITIONS 
STRESS REPRESSORS INTELLECTUALIZERS COMBINED GROUPS 
MEASURE CONDITION MEANS MEDIANS MEANS MEDIANS MEANS MEDIANS 
Alternative Low 13.77 14.00 27.03 18.00 20.40 16.00 
Hypotheses High 11.73 u.oo 22.20 19.00 16.97 12.00 
Total 25.50 24.00 49.23 35.00 37.37 30.00 
CUe Search Low 79.23 52.00 135.57 134.00 107.40 106.00 
High 70.00 53.00 142.77 145.00 106.38 107.00 
Total 149.23 99.00 278.33 273.00 213.78 234.00 
Hypotheses:Cue 
Ratio Low .249 .184 .199 .157 .224 .179 
High .243 .228 .151 .120 .197 .171 
Total .228 .178 .173 .132 .200 .173 
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U Test2, based on ranks, was employed in the analysis of the data. 
The sum of ranks for the Repressors and Intellectualizers, respec-
tively, was 699.50 and 1133.50. This yielded au-value of 615.50, 
a z-value of 2.45 and a p-value of less than .001. These results, 
therefore, confirmed the second prediction. 
and 
The fourth and fifth hypotheses, re~pectively, stated that 
In a perceptual decision making situation, repressive 
defenses restrict the amount of cue search required for 
a final decision 
In a perceptual decision making situation, the intellec-
tualized defenses increase the amount of cue search required 
for a final decision. 
When these hypotheses were combined and translated into the terms 
of the experimental procedures, we arrived at 
Prediction No. 3. The Repressor group will have lower 
Total Cue Search scores than the Intellectualizer group. 
Table III lists the means and medians for each defense 
group on the Total Cue Search measure. . The Repressor group • s dis-
tribution is bimodal and more variable than that of the Intellec-
tualizer group. The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to analyze the 
data. This yielded a sum of ranks of 595.50 for the Repressors 
2s. Siegel. Nonparametric Statistics ~ the Behavioral 
Sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. 
and 1334.50 for the Intellectualizers, aU-value of 719.50, 
a z-value of 3.98, and a p~value of less than .0001. These re-
sults, therefore, confirmed the third prediction. 
The sixth hypothesis stated, 
As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making 
situation, the number of alternative hypotheses formu-
lated is reduced as a function of repressive defenses. 
This hypothesis, when translated into the terms of the experi-
mental procedures, led to 
Prediction No. 4. The Repressor group•s Low Stress Al-
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ternative Hypotheses scores will be higher than their High Stress 
Alternative Hypotheses scores. 
Table III lists the mean and median Alternative Hypotheses 
scores for the Repressor group under each of the two stress condi-
tions. The data were analyzed with the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs 
Signed-Ranks Test.3 This yielded a T•value of 71.50 which is 
significant at the.02 level of probability. The fourth predic-
tion, therefore, is confirmed by these results. 
The seventh hypothesis stated, 
As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making 
£_::.:~-~.:.:..situation, the number of alternative hypotheses formulated 
is raised as function of intellectualized defenses. 
When this hypothesis was translated into the terms of the experi-
mental procedures, we arrived at 
3siegel, .2E.• cit. 
------------ --------------
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Prediction No. 5. The Intellectualizer group's High Stress 
Alternative Hypotheses scores will be higher than their Low Stress 
Alternative Hypotheses scores. 
Table III lists the mean and median scores £or the Intellec-
tualizer group on the Alternati~e Hypotheses measure £or each o£ 
the stress conditions. Both o£ these distributions were markedly 
skewed. The Wilcoxon Test yielded a T-value o£ 158.50 and a 
z-value o£ 1.28, which is signi£ican'b at the .01 level. These 
results were in the direction opposite to that predicted. 
There£ore, the £i£th prediction was infirmed. 
The eighth.hypothesis stated, 
As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making 
situation, the amount o£ cue search required £or a £inal 
decision is reduced as a £unction o~ repressive de£enses. 
This hypothesis, when translated into the terms o£ the experimental 
procedures, led to 
Prediction No. 6. The Repressor group's High Stress Cue 
Search scores will be lower than their Low Stress Cue Search scores. 
Table III lists the :rrean and median scores on the Cue Search 
measure £or the Repressor group under each o£ the two stress con-
ditions. These distributions were markedly skewed. The Wilcoxon 
Test yielded aT-value o£ 137 .5o, a z-value o£ 1.96, and a p-val.ue 
o£ .025. These results, therefore, con£irmed the sixth prediction. 
The ninth hypothesis stated, 
As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making sit-
uation, the amount o£ cue search required £or a £inal deci-
sion is raised as a function of the intellectualized defenses. 
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When this hypothesis was translated into the terms of the experi-
mental operations, we arrived at 
Prediction No. 7. The Intellectualizer group's High Stress 
Cue Search scores will be higher than their Low Stress Cue Search 
scores. 
Table III lists the means and medians for the Intellec-
tualizer group on the Cue Search measure for each of the two 
stress conditions. The Wilcoxon Test yielded a T-value of 155.00, 
and a z-value of 1.60, and a p-value of .06. These results; there-
fore, were in the predicted direction but were not statistically 
significant. 
II. ADDITIONAL RESU~S 
When the decision making test data were analyzed, it 
became apparent that an additional score of potential importance 
could be derived from the two basic scores. This additional 
measure, referred to as the Hypotheses: Cue Ratio, was arrived 
at by dividing the Alternative Hypotheses scores by the Cue Search 
scores. Each subject was given three such ratio scores, i.e. a 
Low Stress ratio, a High Stress ratio, and a Total ratio score. 
The mean and median scores for groups and stress conditions are 
presented in Table III. 
The Hypotheses: Cue Ratio score can be viewed both as a 
.measure of the number of alternative hypotheses formulated per 
----·-----
-----------
----·- ----- --- -- ----------
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unit of cue search and as the reciprocal of the amount of cue search 
required to "check out" each alternative hypothesis, on the average. 
Several statistical comparisons were made among the various 
distributions of Hypotheses: Cue Ratio scores, with the following 
results: 
(a) The Repressor group's Total Hypotheses: Cue Ratio scores 
were found to be higher than those of the Intellectualizer group. 
The Mann-Whitney Test yielded a sum of ranks of 1039.50 for Repres-
sors, a sum of ranks of 790.50 for Intellectualizers, a u-value of 
325.50, a z-value of 1.84, and a p-value of less than .05. 
(b) The Repressor group 1 s Hypotheses: CUe Ratio scores 
obtained under the Low Stress condition did not differ signifi-
cantly from those obtained under the High Stress condition. The 
Wilcoxon Test yielded aT-value of·227.00, which did not permit 
rejection of the null hypothesis. 
(c) The Intellectualizer group's Hypotheses: Cue Ratio 
scores were found to be lower under the High Stress condition 
than under the Low Stress condition. The Wilcoxon Test yielded 
aT-value of 73.00 and a p-value of .02. 
(d) The Hypotheses: Cue Ratio scores of the combined de-
fense groups were found to be lower under the High Stress condition 
than under the Low Stress condition. The Wilcoxon Test yielded a 
T-value of 632.00, a z-value of 1.74 and a p-value of .04. 
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The Total Hypotheses: Cue Ratio scores were correlated with 
the Total Cue Search scores by means of the Spearman Rank Correla-
tion procedure.4 For combined defense groups, a correlation co-
efficient of -.55 was obtained. For the Repressor group, the 
obtained correlation coefficient was -.73. These correlations 
were found to be significant at the.Ol level. For the Intellectu-
alizer group, the correlation was -.22, which was not statistically 
significant. 
4siegel, £2· ~· 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The general problem investigated in this research was the 
relationship of defense preference to decision making. The per-
ceptual decision making performances of repressors and intellec-
tualizers were compared under two different levels of stress. The 
specific decision making variables studied were (1) the number of 
alternative hypotheses formulated, and (2) the amount of cue search 
required for a final decision. 
A set of hypotheses, derived from psychoanalytic theory 
and a model of perceptual decision making, were tested. The 
expertmental data largely confirmed the predictions based on 
these hypotheses. 
The following discussion is devoted to a summary of the 
major findings and their theoretical implications, an evaluation 
of the methodology employed in the study, and suggestions for 
future research. 
I. THE MAJOR FINDINGS 
The evidence supported the hypothesis that repressors 
formulate fewer alternative hypotheses and require less cue 
search to arrive at a final decision than do intellectualizers. 
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In addition, repressors required less cue search per alternative 
hypothesis than did intellectualizers. That is1 the ratio of the 
number of alternative hypotheses formulated to the amount of cue 
search required for a final decision was higher for repressors 
than for intellectualizers. 
As the degree of stress associated with the perceptual 
decision making situation was increased, both repressors and 
intellectualizers decreased the number of alternative hypotheses 
which they formulated. This increased stress also reduced the 
amount of cue search required for a final decision in the case of 
repressors, but tended to increase the amount of cue search 're-
quired by the intellectualizers. (For the intellectualizers, 
the data yielded a p-value of • 06). The ratio of the number of 
alternative hypotheses formulated to the amount of cue search 
required for a final decision was unaffected by increased stress 
in the case of repressors. Intellectualizers and combined defense 
groups, howeve~ decreased in their ratios as stress was increased. 
The results concerning the hypothesis which stated that the 
amount of cue search required for a final decision is a function 
of the number of alternative hypotheses formulated were rendered 
psychologically inconclusive When it was discovered that a metho-
dological artifact could have accounted for the small positive 
correlations which were obtained. That is, an association between 
the two variables was unwittingly built into the experimental 
procedure. 
II. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
According to psychoanalytic theory, man's ability to 
resist immediate gratification of his sexual and aggressive 
instincts is an important factor in preserving his psychic and 
physical integrity. The ego must continually resolve conflicts 
between inner demands and external realities. Psychological 
defenses are erected to meet this need. The nature of the ego 
and the inherent mutability of the instincts determine the forms 
taken by the defenses. In turn, through their continued use, 
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the defenses alter the structure of the ego. What were initially 
emergency measures for handling threatening impulses, subsequently 
become guiding principles which structure life experiences and 
modulate perceptual, cognitive and interpersonal behavior. 
Eventually, the anxiety which originally evoked the defenses 
need no longer be present to set them in motion, although they 
are relied upon most heavily under conditions of stress. The 
results of the present study have suggested some ways in which 
repressive and intellectualized defenses determine behavior in-
volved in the handling of inference. 
The Role of Defense Preference in Complex Mental Performance 
Repressive defenses, which originally serve to keep 
threatening material out of conscious awareness, may produce a 
generalized restriction of the field of consciousness. In 
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decision making situations, this restriction of consciousness 
narrows the array of alternative hypotheses formulated and limits 
the amount of cue search required to cheCk out each alternative 
hypothesis. These consequences, in turn, restrict the amount of 
cue search required to arrive at a final decision. 
Intellectualized defenses, initially erected to shift 
attention away from the emotional significance of conflictual 
situations and on to affect-free, abstract ideation, may result 
in a generalized expansion of conscious ideation. In decision 
making situations, this expansion of consciousness widens the 
array of alternative hypotheses formulated and increases the 
amount of cue search required to check out each alternative 
hypothesis. As a result, the amount of cue search required for 
a final decision is increased. These contrasting effects may 
account for some other important differences between repressors 
and intellectualizers. 
A central characteristic of the repressive personality 
is impulsiveness. Impulsivity appears to the onlooker as hasty, 
faulty, premature judgment based upon a lack of caution, reflection, 
and eabn consideration of all aspects of the situation being dealt 
with. Quite different is the overly cautious behavior exhibited 
py the extreme intellectualizer. , Such an individual appears full 
of doubt, preoccupied with alternate means of tackling problems, 
and generally unable to take a definite stand. At first glance, 
-·---- ~--- -------------- -- --~~~ 
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these two types of decision making behaviors appear qualitatively 
very different. However~ the differences can be described in 
quantitative terms. The evidence suggests that a person reaches 
a decision once he has the experience of having adequately checked 
out all of his alternative hypotheses. This appears as true of 
the impulsive, overly repressive person, as it does of the cautious, 
highly intellectualized individual. Repressors, however, seem im-
pulsive because they formulate few alternative hypotheses and 
require a minimum of cue search to arrive at a decision. Intellec-
tualizers, on the other hand, appear overly cautious because the 
large number of alternative hypotheses which they formulate requi~es 
them to undertake a great deal of cue search before a decision can 
be reached. 
A similar analysis can be made of the concepts of doubt 
and certainty. They can be viewed as experiential indices of the 
product of the number of still-unresolved alternative hypotheses 
and the amount of cue search required to check out each alternative 
hypothesis. We would predict, for instance, that behavior described 
as doubtful or certain can be produced by situationally manipulating 
the nature and number of alternative hypotheses which must be 
checked out before a decision can be reached. 
The conceptual continuum of tolerance-intolerance of 
ambiguity can also be treated in this framework. In this view, 
people do not differ in their tolerance or intolerance of ambiguity, 
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but differ in the extent to which they experience situations as 
ambiguous. Luchins states that, 
The ambiguous field permits a variety of structures, offer-
ing the individual a complex array of choice,, with not much 
to hold on to and the possibility of predicting the results 
of his decisions lessened because of the lack of definitive 
cues. This may mean lack of cues, vagueness of cues, or the 
presence of inconsistent or contradictory cues. The highly 
structured field, on the other hand~ provides guide lines; 
the individual may properly evaluate it, and behave toward 
it in a meaningful way.l 
This definition deals only with the stimulus aspect of the situation 
and does not deal with the experience of ambiguity. Taken alone, 
it suggests that the degree of ambiguity experienced in a situation 
is an inverse function of the number of definitive cues available. 
In our view, however, the degree of ambiguity experienced in a 
situation is a function not only of the number of definitive cues 
available in the situation, but also fo the number of alternative 
hypotheses formulated by the individual, as well as the amount of 
cue search he requires to check out each of his alternative hypoth-
eses. This would explain, for instance, why intellectualizers 
tend to be more doubtful in uambiguous" situations than repressors. 
Thus fa~, ways in which repressive and intellectualized 
defenses can produce such tendencies as impulsivity, caution, 
certainty, and doubt, as well as determine the degree of ambiguity 
experienced in a situation~ have been discussed. It appears that 
other personality demensions, such as flexibility-rigidity and 
depth-shallowness, could be given similar interpretations. 
lA. Luchins. The stimulus field in social psychology. 
Psychol. ~·, 1950, 57, 27·30. 
~-- -- ------- -·· --- ~-----
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The Effects of Stress on Decision Making Behavior 
Numerous studies have indicated that psychological stress 
has profound effects on complex mental behavior. This factor, 
plus the theoretical expectation that increased stress would 
highlight the effects of the defensesJ suggested that much in-
formation could be gained by studying the decision making behaviors 
of repressors and intellectualizers under two different conditions 
of stress. 
The effects of stress found in related studies can be 
placed into two major categories. The first category contains 
those effects which tend to be disruptive and unrelated to in• 
dividual differences in personality structure. Such effects as 
primitivization of perception2,3 and cognitive rigidity4 are of 
this type. The second category is comprised of those effects 
which tend to be adjustive and related to individual differences 
in personality structure. This category would contain some per-
2t. Postman and J. s. Bruner. Perception under stress. 
Psychol. Rev., 1948, ~' 314-323. 
3c. D. SmoCk. The influence of psychological stress 
on "intolerance of ambiguity." l· ~· .!££• Psychol., 1955, 
2.Qr 177-182. 
4 E. L. Cowen. The influence of varying degrees of 
psychological stress on problem solving rigidity. l• ~· !2£• 
Psycho1., 1952, 47, 512-519. 
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ceptual defense and vigilance phenomena5>6 and individual differ-
ences in the learning of stressful vs. non-stressful material.7 
That stress bas these two types of effects can be explained 
by the two-fold nature of anxiety. Fenichel8 reports that anxiety 
has an inappropriate and disruptive aspect, since it is basically 
a primitive emergency reaction as well as an appropriate and 
adaptive aspect, based on its role as a danger signal which sets 
adjustive ego-functions into operation. If we assume that psycho-
logical stress induces anxiety, then their corresponding types of 
effects become understandable. 
In the present study, stress was found to have both types 
of effects on perceptual decision making. The outstanding effect 
of increased stress which seemed unrelated to defense preference 
and which was potentially disruptive was its reduction of the 
number of alternative hypotheses formulated. This may well be 
an expression of increased cognitive and perceptual rigidity. 
Sn. Carpenter, M. WienerJ and Janeth T. Carpenter. 
dictability of perceptual defense behavior. J. abn. soc. 
1956, 52, 380-383. - - -
Pre-
Psychol., 
6a. s. Lazarus, c. w. Eriksen, and c. P. Fonda. Personality 
dynamics and auditory perceptual recognition. d· ~·, 1951, J:.2., 
471-482. 
7Lillian Belmont and R. G. Birch. Re-individualizing the 
repression hypothesis. d· ~· !££· Psychol., 1951, ~, 226-235. 
Bo. Fenichel. !!:!!, Psychoanalytic Theory of the Neurosis. 
New York: w. w. Norton, 1945. 
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It also may be a perceptual decision making counterpart of the 
clinically-observed "blocking" of patients under stress. Two 
other effects of increased stress were related to defense pre-
ference. Repressors decreased~ whereas intellectualizers tended 
to increase, in the amount of cue search required for a final 
decision. In addition, intellectualizers were found to increase 
the amount of cue search undertaken per alternative hypothesis 
as stress was increased. These effects fall into the second 
category of effects of stress. They suggest that increased 
stress produces increased impulsiveness in repressive individuals 
and increased caution in intellectualizers. This also suggests 
that psychological stress increases reliance on preferred de-
fenses and leads to an exaggeration of characteristic response 
patterns. 
The Model of Perceptual Decision Makin& 
The efficacy of the model of perceptual decision making 
employed in the present study was generally supported by the ex-
perimental results. One change in the model, however, seems 
indicated by the supplemental findings regarding differences 
between the defense groups in their ratios of number of alternative 
hypotheses formulated to amount of cue search required for a 
final decision. Repressors were found to require less cue 
search per alternative hypothesis than were intellectualizers. 
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This finding is in keeping with clinical observations.9,10 Such 
observations have suggested that repressive individuals, when 
confronted with a decision, do not carefully evaluate each of 
their alternative hypotheses, wheEeas intellectualizers tend to 
carefully check out each alternative as it presents itself. 
In short, there is a need for a ntwo-factor" model. It 
had been proposed that the amount of cue search required for a 
final decision was simply a function of the number of alternative 
hypotheses formulated. Now, however, it is proposed that the 
amount of cue search required for a final decision is the product 
of the number of alternative hypotheses formulated multiplied by 
the amount of cue search required to check out each alternative 
hypothesis. This latter factor varies considerably from individual 
to individual and may take the form of a personal constant appli-
cable to a variety of situations involving processes of inference. 
III. EVALUAXION OF METHODOLOGY 
The sentence-completion test apparently was successful 
in determining repressive and intellectualized defenses. Its 
9R. Schafer. Psychoanalytic Interpretation in Rorschach 
Testing. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1954, p. 55. 
1~. Cameron and Ann Margaret. :Behavior Pathology. 
:Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951, pp. 301-302. 
reliability and predictive value, both in the present study and 
in a previous investigation,ll proved to be very adequate. The 
sentence-completion method, with its explicit scoring criteria, 
probably could be adapted for use in translating other psycho-
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analytic concepts into operational terms suitable for experimental 
use. 
The perceptual decision making test, although generally 
effective, was found to have certain shortcomings. The major 
flaw was its failure to permit the alternative hypotheses and cue 
search measures to vary independently of each other. A positive 
association between these measures was unwittingly built into the 
test, since the opportunity for formu~ating alternative hypotheses 
was directly related to the amount of cue search required for a 
final decision. Since each test picture was removed as soon as 
a decision was made, subjects who arrived at their decisions with 
a mintmum of the picture exposed had less opportunity to formulate 
alternative hypotheses than did subjects who made their decisions 
after most of the picture had been revealed. The discover of 
this methodological artifact rendered the positive correlations 
obtained between the Alternative Hypotheses and Cue Search scores 
psychologically inconclusive. That is, we do not know whether 
1l:s. Carpenter, M. Wiener, and J'aneth T. 
Fredictability of perceptual defense behavior. 
Fsychol., 1956, 52, 380-383. 
Carpenter. 
l• abn • .!££• 
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such correlations can be attributed to the built-in association or 
reflect a true psychological relationship between the two variables. 
Similarly, we cannot properly evaluate the negative correlations 
obtained between the Hypotheses: CUe Ratio and Cue S~arch scores. 
Another draw-back of the test was the limitations it placed on the 
type of stimuli employed and, consequently, the nature of the cue 
search behavior studied. In order to obtain a wide distribu-
tion of cue search scores on the apparatus used, a very special 
type of picture had to be employed. These pictures had the bulk 
of their stimulus-information appearing at or near the very bottom. 
The use of pictures with more evenly spread stimulus information 
probably would have produced so narrow a range of cue search scores 
that fine discriminations among subjects would have been impossible. 
As a result of using such nlopsided"pictures, subjects were prac-
tically forced to adopt a sudden insight approach to the decision 
making task. The gradual accumulation of cues, which surely char-
acterizes many decision making situations, would be most difficult 
to implement on the apparatus employed. 
The stress-arousing criticism used in the study apparently 
was successful in producing anxiety and increased defensiveness. 
This was evident both from the subjects' verbalizations and the 
changes in their decision making behavior in response to the 
criticism. However, it seemed that this criticism served not 
only to increase stress, but also bad a negatively reinforcing 
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effect on the subject's ongoing approach to the decision making 
task. In a sense, when delivering the stress criticism, the ex-
aminer told the subject that he was ttwrong" in going about the 
task as he had been doing. For example, an intellectualizer who 
had been postponing his decisions until most of the picture was 
exposed could interpret the stress criticismto mean that he should 
now shift his approach and start emphasizing swiftness of decision. 
Such purposeful shifts in approach would tend to cancel out the 
effects of increased defenst~ess produced by the criticism. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The problem created by the built•in association between 
the alternative hypotheses and cue search measures of the de-
cision making test could be overcome through a change in method 
of presenting the stimuli. In future studies, stimulus pictures 
would be presented in their entirety, regardless of the point at 
which a final decision is reported. In'this way, the opportunity 
for formulating alternative hypotheses would be equal for all 
subjects. Such a method would have the additional benefit of 
providing observations regarding the way in which subjects treat 
additional information after having committed themselves to a 
definite decision. It might prove especially helpful in studying 
how defenses operate to resolve cognitive and perceptual dis-
crepancies. 
~--~------~-~-·-·--· 
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As was mentioned above, the decision making test demanded 
a specific kind of cue search behavior from the subject. It did 
not provide for the study of cue search behavior in a situation 
involving the gradual accumulation of cues. To round out our un-
derstanding of cue search behavior, studies which utilize stimuli 
presented in increasing intensity, rather than in cumulative areal 
segments, would be helpful. Such studies could utilize the appa-
ratus usually employed in threshold experiments and would not be 
as limited in the type of stimuli employed. 
An important variable which was beyond the scope of the 
present study is the degree of accuracy of decisions: It is 
obvious, for example, that minimal cue search has greater survi-
val value if accompanied by accuracy than if it is combined with 
autism. The methodology of studies which could shed light on 
this veridicality aspect of decisions would have to depart sig-
nificantly from that of the present study. The stimuli employed 
in the present study were not suitable for such a purpose. For, 
the variety of responses which could have been considered accur-
ate when the pictures were partially exposed was fairly limitless. 
On the other hand, the resultslincated virtually complete agree-
ment among subjects' decisions when these were made in response 
to fully exposed pictures. Here, too, stimuli presented in in-
creasing intensity would be better suited for obtaining a wide 
distribution of accuracy-of-decision scores. 
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The shortcomings of the stress-arousing criticism employed 
in the present study could be remedied by a change in the research 
design. There is a need for studies which introduce stress but 
which do not negatively reinforce the subject's ongoing mode of 
approach to the decision making task. One solution to this problem 
would be to introduce stress at the same point as was done in the 
present study but somehGW remove all elements of criticism from it. 
Another possible remedy would be to employ four groups of subjects 
instead of two. In this way, there would be a repressor group 
tested only under low stress and one tested only under high stress. 
Similarly, there would be two intellectualizer groups--one tested 
under low stress and the other tested under high stress. Such a 
design could test the same hypotheses as were investigated in the 
present study but would avoid the contaminating effects of a 
negatively reinforcing stress criticism. 
The model of perceptual decision making employedf:in the 
present study rests on the proposition that decision making be-
havior is largely determined by the degree of conscious ideation 
occurring within the individ~al. It was assumed, for example, that 
the differences in the decision making behaviors between repressors 
and intellectualizers can be attributed to the differences in 
degree of conscious ideation as.sociated With their defenses. 
However, this must remain only an assumption so long as we have 
not directly measured the degree of conscious ideation occurring 
within the subjects. Therefore, same work on a technique for 
making such a measurement seems warranted, if we are to fully 
understand the relationship between that variable and perceptual 
decision making. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY 
The general problem investigated in this research was the 
relationship of defense preference to decision making. The per-
ceptual decision making performances of repressors and intellectual-
izers were compared under two different levels of stress. The 
specific decision making variables studied were (1) the number 
of alternative hypotheses formulated and (2) the amount of cue 
search required for a final decision. 
Psychoanalytic defense theory, Bruner•s approach to per-
ception)l and literature dealing with psychological stress served 
as the theoretical basis for the study. The emp·irical background 
included studies involving the relationships of personality 
variables and psychological stress to complex mental performance. 
A model of perceptual decision making, based on the work 
of Bruner, was employed as a framework against which to view the 
relationships between defense and decision making. It consisted 
of the following propositions which describe some processes at 
work within an individual confronted with the task of making a 
decision regarding the nature of a stimulus: 
1 
.:r. s. Bruner. On perceptual readiness. PsychoL_~., 
19 57, .§.~.;--·12 3-152. 
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(a) The individual scans the available stimulus-information 
and formulates a set of alternative hypotheses. These 
alternative hypotheses are eq~ivalent to conscious 
ideas. 
(b) The individual searches for cues with which to infirm 
or confiDn his alternative hypotheses. Each such 
hypothesis, or idea, requires a certain amount of cue 
search before it can be infirmed or confirmed. 
(c) The individual reaches a final decision once he has 
carried out the required amount of cue search for 
rejecting all of his alternative hypotheses except 
for one. 
The following set of hypotheses, derived ~ psychoana-
lytic theory and the model of perceptual decision making, were 
tested: 
(l) In a perceptual decision making situation, the amount 
of cue search required for a final decision is a function of the 
number of alternative hypotheses formulated. 
(2) In a perceptual decision making situation, repressive 
defenses restrict the number of alternative hypotheses formulated. 
(3) In a perceptual decision making situation, intellec-
tualized defenses increase the number of alternative hypotheses 
formulated. 
(4) In a perceptual decision making situation, repressive 
defenses restrict the amount of cue search required for a final 
decision. 
(5) In a perceptual decision making situation> intellec• 
tualized defenses increase the amount of cue search required for 
a final decision. 
(6) As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making 
situation, the number of alternative hypotheses formulated is re-
duced as a function of repressive defenses. 
(7) As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making 
situation, the number of alternative hypotheses formulated is 
raised as a function of intellectualized defenses. 
---------------
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(8) As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making 
situation, the amount of cue search required for a final decision 
is reduced as a function of repressive defenses. 
(9) As stress is increased in a perceptual decision making 
situation, the amount of cue search required for a final decision 
is raised as a function of intellectualized defenses. 
The 224 college-student subjects were administered a sentence• 
completion test as a measure of defense preference. This test was 
a modified version of that designed and employed by Wiener, Carpen-
ter and Carpenter.2 On the basis of extreme scores on the test, 
30 of the subjects were selected as the Repressor group and 30 
as the Intellectualizer group. Each member of both defense groups 
was then administered the perceptual decision making test. This 
test contained eight crudely drawn pictures presented, by means of 
a special device, in cumulative honzontal segments. The two basic 
decisbn making measures were: (1) Alternative Hypotheses, a score 
determined by the number of different "possibilitiesn which the 
subject reported regarding the stimulus, and (2) Cue Search, a 
measure based on the number of cumulative horizontal segments of 
the picture area which the subject required to be exposed before 
he arrived at a final decision. The decision making test was 
presented in two parts, with four of the pictures presented under 
the Low Stress condition and four under the High Stress condition. 
~. Wiener, B. Carpenter, and Janeth T. Carpenter. De-
termination of defense mechanisms for conflict areas from verbal 
material. d· consult. Psychol., 1956, 20, 215-219. 
-~-----------------
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The stress conditions were defined by the examiner•s instructions 
and criticisms. 
The evidence supported the hypothesis that repressors for-
mulate fewer alternative hypotheses and require less cue search to 
arrive at a final decision than do intellectualizers. In addition, 
repressors were found to require less cue search per alternative 
hypothesis than were intellectualizers. That is, the ratio of 
the number of alternative hypotheses formulated to the amount of 
cue search required for a final decision was higher for repressors 
than for intellectualizers. 
As the degree of stress associated with the perceptual 
decision making situation was increased, both repressors and 
intellectualizers decreased the number of alternative hypotheses 
which they formulated. This increased stress also reduced the 
amount of cue search required for a final decision in the case 
of repressors, but tended to increase the amount of cue search 
required by intellectualizers. The ratio of the number of al-
ternative hypotheses formulated to the amount of cue search re-
quired for a final decision was unaffected by increased stress 
in the case of repressors. Intellectualizers and combined 
defense groups, however, decreased in their ratios as stress 
was increased. 
The results concerning the hypothesis which stated that 
the amount of cue search required for a final decision is a 
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function of the number of alternative hypotheses formulated were 
rendered psychologically inconclusive when it was discovered that 
a methodological artifact could have accounted for the small 
positive correlations which were obtained. 
A discussion was devoted to the theoretical implications 
of the results, an evaluation of the methodology employed, and 
suggestions for future research. The major conclusions were: 
(1) Repressive defenses~ which originally serve to keep 
threatening material out af conscious awareness, may produce a 
generalized restriction of the field of consciousness. In 
decision making situation~, this restriction of consciousness 
narrows the array of alternative hypotheses formulated and ltmits 
the amount of cue searCh required to cheCk out each alternative 
hypothesis. These consequences, in turn, restrict the amount of 
cue search required to arrive at a final decision. 
(2) Intellectualized defenses, initially erected to shift 
attention away from the emotional significance of conflictual 
situations and on to affect-free, abstract ideation, may result' 
in a generalized expansion of conscious ideation. In decision 
making situations, this expansion of consciousness widens the 
array of alternative hypotheses formulated and increases the 
amount of cue search required to check out each alternative 
hypothesis. As a result, the amount of cue search required for 
a final decision is increased. 
(3) Psychological stress has two kinds of effects on 
complex mental performance. On the one hand, it produces 
cognitive rigidity and "blocking. n On the other hand, it in 
creases reliance on the preferred defenses and exaggerates 
characteristic response tendencies. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE PERCEPTUAL DECISION MAKING TEST STIMULI 
A. UMBRELLA 
B. SNAKE 
c. WATCH 
D. GOLF CLUB 
E. LADLE 
F. PENCIL 
G. PIPE 
H. HAMMER 
I. BOOT 
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A. 11'1BRELL.A 
(The Demonstration Picture) 
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B. SNAKE 
C. 1-!ATCH 
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D. GOLF CLUB 
E. LADLE 
83 
F. PENCIL 
G. PIPE 
84 
H. HAMMER 
I. BOOT 
APPENDIX :B 
THE PERCEPTUAL DECISION MAKING TEST SCORES 
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Table 1 
Alternative Hypotheses Scores of the Individual Members of the 
Repressor Group 
Subject 
No. Low Stress High Stress Tote~ Score 
1 9 11 20 
2 1.3 ll 24 
.3 9 9 IS 
4 10 8 18 
5 24 1.3 .37 
6 17 12 29 
7 10 7 17 
8 14 6 20 
9 6 6 12 
10 17 8 25 
11 7 10 17 
12 2.3 IS 41 
l.3 15 1.3 28 
14 6 4 10 
15 19 16 .35 
16 5 5 10 
17 18 29 47 
IS 5 4 9 
19 14 26 40 
20 15 9 24 
21 6 6 12 
22 17 1.3 .30 
2.3 5 6 ll 
24 18 1.3 .31 
25 22 12 .34 
26 10 ll 21 
27 14 12 26 
28 20 14 .34 
29 26 25 51 
.30 19 15 .34 
Mean 1.3.77 ll.7.3 25.50 
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Table 2 
Alternative Hypotheses S6ores of the Individual Members of the 
Intellectualizer Group 
Subject 
No. Lovr Stress High Stress Total Score 
1 11 9 20 2 Z7 8 35 3 10 5 15 4 17 9 26 5 21 25 46 6 36 14 50 7 
.39 Z7 66 8 61 31 92 9 18 22 40 10 24 
.31 55 11 28 19 47 12 28 22 50 1.3 17 19 36 14 194 127 
.321 15 1.3 12 25 16 30 30 6o 17 26 29 55 18 
.37 40 77 19 12 9 21 20 16 11 Zl 21 26 21 47 22 14 10 24 2.3 20 15 35 24 1.3 19 
.32 25 6 10 16 26 10 2.3 
.3J Z7 7 12 19 28 21 
.32 53 29 16 15 
.31 30 1.3 10 2.3 
1-!eans 'Z/.03 22.20 49.2.3 
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Table J 
Cue Search Scores of the Individual Members of the 
Repressor Group 
Subject 
No. Lov Stress High Stress Total Score 
1 28 32 60 
2 30 105 135 
J 174 151 325 
4 64 19 8J 
5 134 32 166 
6 1IJ Z7 67 
7 20 66 86 
8 76 121 lo/7 
9 25 24 49 
10 177 69 246 
11 96 100 196 
12 177 79 256 
1.3 JO 28 58 
14 162 144 306 
15 134 70 204 
16 29 53 82 
17 JJ 74 107 
18 67 32 99 
19 49 110 159 
20 175 170 345 
21 J6 24 60 
22 51 22 73 
23 61 35 96 
24 41 44 85 
25 91 106 lo/7 
26 19 18 37 
27 43 30 73 
28 96 o/7 193 
29 167 171 338 
30 52 47 99 
Means 79.23 70.00 149.23 
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Table 4 
Cue Search Scores o:r the Individual Members o:r the 
Intellectualizer Group 
Subject 
No. LOll' Stress High Stress Total Score 
1 56 107 163 
2 186 188 374 
3 93 140 233 
4 99 135 234 
5 107 138 245 
6 156 117 273 
7 116 164 280 
8 136 162 298 
9 106 119 225 
10 155 105 260 
11 178 134 312 
12 90 94 184 
13 159 100 259 
14 180 184 364 
15 171 175 346 
16 121 163 284 
17 142 115 257 
18 100 155 255 
19 177 145 322 
20 160 173 333 
21 166 175 341 
22 83 99 182 
23 134 172 306 
24 129 164 293 
25 101 :L44 245 
26 95 160 255 
27 180 152 332 
28 129 169 298 
29 158 179 337 
30 153 107 260 
Means 135-57 142.77 278.33 
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Table 5 
Hypotheses : Cue Ratio Scores of the Individual Members 
of the Repressor Group 
Subject 
No. Low Stress High Stress Total Score 
l .321 
-344 .333 
2 
-433 .105 .178 
3 .052 .060 .055 
4 .156 -421 .217 
5 .179 .416 .223 
6 .425 
·444 -433 
7 .500 .106 .198 
8 .184 .050 .102 
9 -240 .250 -245 
10 .096 .116 .102 
ll .CJ73 .100 .987 
12 .130 .228 .160 
13 .500 .464 
-483 
14 .037 .028 .029 
15 .142 .229 .174 
16 .172 .094 .122 
17 .545 -392 -439 
18 .075 .125 .091 
19 .286 .236 .251 
20 .086 .053 .069 
21 .167 .250 .200 
22 
-333 -591 ·411 
23 .082 .171 .115 
24 -439 .295 .365 
25 
-242 .113 .173 
26 
-526 .611 .568 
Z7 .326 .400 -356 
28 .209 .149 .173 
29 .156 .146 .151 
30 .365 .319 
-343 
Means ·2492 -2435 .2282 
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Table 6 
Hypotheses: Cue Ratio Scores of the Individual Members 
of the Inte11ectualiaer Group 
Subject 
No. Lovr Stress High Stress Total Score 
1 .196 .083 .123 
2 .146 .043 .094 
3 .107 .036 .064 
4 .172 .067 .111 
5 .196 .181 .186 
6 .231 .120 .183 
7 .336 .165 .236 
8 
-448 .130 .309 
9 .169 .185 .178 
10 .155 .295 .212 
11 .157 
·142 .151 
12 .311 .234 .272 
1.3 .107 .190 .139 
14 1.078 .690 .882 
15 .076 .069 .072 
16 .24$ .184 .211 
17 .183 .252 .214 
18 .370 .259 .302 
19 .068 .062 .065 
20 .100 .064 .081 
21 .157 .120 .138 
22 .169 .101 .1.32 
23 ·149 .087 .114 
24 .101 .116 .109 
25 .059 .070 .065 
26 .105 .144 .129 
27 .039 .079 .057 
28 .163 .190 .178 
29 .10~ .084 .093 
30 .085 .093 .088 
Meam.s .1994 .1512 .1729 
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Table 7 
The Repressor Group•s Alternative Hypotheses Scores for the 
Eight Serial Picture Positions 
Subject Serial Positions 
No. I II III IV v VI VII VIII 
1 3 2 2 2 a 1 3 4 
2 6 4 1 2 1 4 3 3 
3 4 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 
4 4 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 
5 4 6 6 8 1 5 3 4 
6 5 3 3 6 3 2 3 4 
7 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 
8 4 4 2 4 1 3 1 1 
9 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
10 6 4 3 4 2 1 2 3 
11 3 1 2 1 3 3 3 1 
12 8 5 3 7 9 2 3 4 
13 5 3 3 4 3 3 5 2 
14 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
15 4 9 2 4 7 3 2 4 
16 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 
17 6 7 3 2 8 4 5 12 
18 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
19 1 4 3 6 4 6 7 9 
20 6 3 4 2 3 2 3 1 
21 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 
22 3 5 6 3 3 6 2 2 
23 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 
24 6 4 3 5 3 2 5 3 
25 4 8 6 4 3 3 5 1 
26 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 4 
Z7 2 5 5 2 2 5 3 2 
28 6 4 3 7 4 3 3 4 
29 10 7 5 4 7 11 3 4 
30 4 4 6 5 4 4 4 3 
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Table 8 
The Intellectualizer Group1 s Alternative Hypotheses Scores 
for the Eight Serial Picture Positions 
Subject Serial Positions 
No. I II III IV v VI VII VIII 
1 3 1 4 3 3 1 2 3 
2 8 7 7 5 1 2 2 3 
3 3 2 4 1 1 1 1 2 
4 4 2 5 6 3 1 2 3 
5 4 7 6 4 8 8 4 5 
6 10 12 8 6 3 4 3 4 
7 11 12 8 8 8 5 9 5 
8 18 18 14 11 8 8 4 7 
e 4 2 2 10 8 5 3 6 
10 4 6 7 7 7 9 9 6 
11 9 6 8 5 6 5 4 4 
12 9 4 5 10 3 13 3 3 
13 3 4 6 4 4 4 2 9 
14 45 58 51 40 11 59 26 31 
15 5 2 2 4 3 4 4 1 
16 6 15 2 7 6 7 7 10 
17 4 6 11 5 6 6 6 11 
18 4 19 10 4 5 17 14 4 
19 4 2 3 3 3 1 3 2 
20 5 5 4 2 4 2 2 3 
21 5 6 5 10 5 6 6 4 
22 5 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 
23 4 6 4 6 5 3 5 2 
24 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 7 
25 2 1 1 2 3 1 3 3 
26 2 3 2 3 8 5 6 4 
27 1 1 3 2 4 4 2 2 
28 4 3 5 9 7 10 4 11 
29 3 6 4 3 3 6 4 2 
30 4 2 3 4 3 1 4 2 
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Table 9 
The Repressor Group's Cue Search Scores for the Eight 
Serial Picture Positions 
subject Serial Positions 
No. I II III IV v VI VII VIII 
1 6 6 8 8 8 6 7 11 
2 8 7 5 10 12 43 26 24 
3 45 43 45 41 47 47 46 11 
4 20 27 12 5 3 7 6 3 
5 11 40 42 41 6 5 7 14 
6 14 10 6 10 7 6 5 9 
7 4 3 9 4 6 13 6 41 
8 25 26 12 13 47 17 47 10 
9 15 2 4 4 3 7 8 6 
10 36 46 48 47 11 10 19 29 
11 43' 5 7 41 40 33 23 4 
12 48 45 42 42 38 6 3 32 
13 9 5 8 8 8 5 8 7 
14 41 40 41 40 9 44 44 47 
15 37 38 16 43 28 11 10 21 
16 7 5 8 9 11 17 10 15 
17 10 15 4 4 42 7 10 15 
18 45 4 5 13 6 4 15 7 
19 16 14 7 12 19 13 33 45 
20 45 38 45 47 45 40 43 42 
21 14 7 5 10 5 6 7 6 
22 13 17 17 4 5 11 4 12 
23 24 7 6 24 4 17 4 10 
24 22 6 6 7 4 3 15 22 
25 13 12 29 37 37 17 38 14 
26 9 3 3 4 5 4 5 4 
27 14 9 14 6 11 11 4 4 
28 30 11 14 41 27 7 16 47 
29 40 43 41 43 41 41 44 45 
30 8 10 27 7 14 10 11 12 
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Table 10 
The Intellectualizer Group's Cue Search Scores for the 
Eight Serial Picture Positions 
Subject Serial Positions 
No. I II III IV v VI VII VIII 
1 35 17 43 12 9 10 15 22 
2 46 40 50 50 47 47 46 48 
3 30 7 46 10 13 41 46 40 
4 25 21 28 25 46 33 22 34 
5 43 15 24 25 36 20 39 43 
6 37 42 47 30 13 39 20 45 
7 39 38 30 9 43 43 38 40 
8 37 31 27 41 41 39 39 43 
9 26 17 23 40 41 21 20 37 
10 21 46 45 43 23 27 38 17 
11 43 48 46 41 45 46 34 9 
12 24 11 14 41 4 44 23 23 
13 47 45 40 27 17 16 17 50 
14 47 45 42 46 40 49 49 46 
15 42 44 45 40 43 43 47 42 
16 30 44 14 33 33 44 41 45 
17 47 10 43 42 4 41 30 40 
18 8 34 37 21 37 42 42 34 
19 43 47 45 42 45 40 40 20 
20 42 46 42 30 47 46 30 50 
21 45 41 41 39 43 40 44 48 
22 21 21 17 24 27 21 37 14 
23 40 40 24 30 43 41 46 42 
24 42 18 27 42 44 34 40 46 
25 27 14 26 34 46 27 33 38 
.26 30 17 18 30 42 37 44 37 
27 43 46 47 44 44 42 24 42 
28 43 17 24 45 41 43 42 43 
29 37 40 41 40 t~ 41 50 45 30 42 40 40 31 20 43 14 
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Tabl-e 11 
The Repressor Group's Alternative Hypotheses Scores for Each 
Stimulus Picture 
Pictures 
Subject Golf 
No. Snake Watch Club Ladle Pencil Pipe Hammer Boot 
1 4 3 2 .2 2 3 1 .3 
2 .3 6 4 f 2 1 4 .3 
3 2 
.3 4 1 2 2 3 1 
4 .3 2 4 2 3 2 1 1 
5 1 5 .3 4 4 6 6 8 6 6 3 2 .3 4 5 .3 .3 
7 2 3 2 2 2 1 .3 2 
8 4 2 4 1 .3 1 1 4 
9 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
10 3 6 4 .3 4 2 1 2 
11 3 1 .3 1 2 1 .3 .3 
12 2 3 4 8 5 .3 7 9 
13 3 .3 5 2 5 .3 ".3 4 
14 1 1 1 1 1 .3 1 1 
15 9 2 4 7 .3 2 4 4 
16 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2. 
17 12 6 7 .3 2 8 4 5 
18 1 1 2 1 1-- 1 1 1 
19 6 7 9 1 4 .3 6 4 
20 .3 2 .3 1 6 .3 4 2 
21 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 
22 6 3 .3 6 2 2 .3 5 
2.3 2 :t• 1 2 1 2 1 1 
24 6 4 .3 5 3 2 5 .3 
25 1 4 8 6 4 .3 3 5 
26 .3 4 .3 1 .3 3 .3 1 
27 5 .3 2 2 5 5 2 2 
28 4 .3 .3 4 6 4 3 7 
29 4 7 11 .3 4 10 7 5 
30 6 5 4 4 4 .3 4 4 
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Table 12 
The Intellectualizer Group• s Alternative Hypotheses Scores £or 
.Each Stimulus Pict'tl:re 
Pictures L.i. 
Subject Golf' 
No. Snake 'Watch Club Ladle Pencil Pipe Hammer Boot 
-, 
1 3 1 4 3 3 1 2 3 2 s 7 7 5 1 2 2 3 
3 1 2 3 2 4 1 1 1 
4 1 2 4 3 2 5 6 3 
5 s s 4 5 4 7 6 4 
- 6 6 3 4 3 4 10 12 s -
7 s s s 5 9 5 11 12 s lS 14 11 s s s 7 lS 
9 4 2 2 10 s 5 3 6 10 6 4 6 7 7 7 9 9 ll 4 4 9 6 8 5 6 5 12 13 3 3 9 4 5 10 3 13 4 4 2 9 3 4 6 4 14 40 ll 59 26 31 45 58 51 15 2 4 3 4 4 1 5 2 16 15 i 7 6 7 7 10 b 
17 4 6 11 5 6 6 6 11 
lS 4 4 9 10 4 5 17 14 19 3 2 4 2 3 3 3 1 20 2 2 3 5-- 5 4 2 4 21 5 6 6 4 5 6 5 10 22 3 4 2 2 2 5 3 3 
23 4 6 5 3 5 2 4 6 
24 3 3 4 4 4 4 7 3 25 2 1 1 2 3' 1 3 3 26 4 2 3 2 3 s 5 6 
Z7 2 2 1 1 3 2 4 4 28 10 5 9 4 3 4 11 7 
29 3 6 4 2 3 6 4 3 30 4 3 1 4 4 2 2 3 
98 
Table 13 
The Repressor Group's Cue Search Scores for Each Stimulus 
Picture 
Subject Golf 
No. Snake Watch Club Ladle Pencil Pipe Hammer Boot 
1 11 6 ~ 8 8 8 6 7 2 24 g ··7:. 5 10 1.2 43 26 3 46 11 4ti 43 45 41 47 47 4 7 6 2~ 3 27 12 5 3 5 6 5 7; 14 11 40 42 41 6 10 7 6 5 9 14 .. 10 6 7 9 4 6 13 6 41 4 3 8 26 12 13 47 17 47 10 25 9 15 2 4 4 3 7 8 6 10 29 39 46 48 47 11 10 19 11 23 4 43 5 7 41 40 33 12 6 3 32 48 45 42 42 38 13 8 5 ·8 7 9 5 8 8 14 40 9 44 44 47 41 40 41 15 38 16 43 28 11 10 21 37 16 7 5 8 9 11 17 10 15 17 15 10 15 4 4 42 7 10 18 15 7 45 4 5 13 6 4 19 13 33 45 16 14 7 12 19 20 45 40 43 42 45 38 45 47 21 10 5 6 7 6 14 7 5 22 17 4 5 11 4 12 13 17 23 7 6 24 4 17 4 10 24 24 22 6 6 7 4 3 15 22 25 14 13 12 29 37 37 17 38 26 5 4 9 3 3 4 5 4 27 11 4 4 14 9 14 6 11 28 27 7 1"6 47 30 11 14 41 29 43 41 41 44 45 40 43 41 30 27 7 14 10 11 12 8 10 
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Table 14 . 
The Intellectualizer Groupt s Cue Search Scores .for Each 
Stimulus Picture 
Subject Go1£ 
Boot No. Snake Watch Club Ladle Pencil Pipe Hammer 
1 35 17 34 12 9 10 15 22 2 46 40 50 5"0 47 -47 46 -48 3 46 40 .30 7 46 10 13 41 4 3.3 22 25 46 21 28 25 34 5 36 20 .39 43 4.3 15 24 25 6 .30 13 .39 20 45 37 42 47. 7 30 9 43 43 .38 40 .39 .38 8 .31 27 41 4J. 39 39 43 37 9 26 17 23 40 41 21 20 .37 10 17 21 46 45 43 23 27 .38 11 34 9 43 48 46 41 45 46 12 44 23 23 24 11 14 41 4 13 17 16 17 50 47 45 40 27 14 46 40 49 49 46 47 45 42 15 45 40 4.3 .~3 47 42 42 44 16 44 14 .33 .33 44 41 45 .30 17 47 10 43' 42 4 41 .30 40 18 .34 fr 34 .37 21 37 42 42 19 40 20 4.3 47 45 42 . 45 40 20 46 30 50 42 46 42 .30 47 21 4.3 40 44 48 45 41 41 .39 22 24 27 21 .37 14 2l 2:P. 17 23 24 30 4.3 41 46 42 40 40 
24 Z7 18 42 44 .34 40 46 42 25 27 14 26 3L~ 46 27 .3.3 38 26 37 .30 17 18 
.30 42 .37 44 27 24 42 4.3 46 47 44 44 42 28 43 24 45 4.3 17 42 43 41 29 4.3 41 50 45 .37 40 41 40 30 .31 .30 20 43 42 14 40 40 
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The general problem investigated was the relationship between 
psychological defense and decision making. The perceptual decision 
making performances of repressors and intellectualizers were com-
pared under two different conditions of stress. The specific 
decision making variables studied were (1) the number of alterna-
tive hypotheses formulated, and (2) the amount of cue search required 
for a final decision • 
. A sentence-completion test, which served as the measure of 
defense preference, was administered to 224 college students. On 
the basis of extreme scores on this test, 30 subjects were selected 
as the repressor group and 30 as the intellectualizer group. These 
60 subjects were then administered the perceptual decision making 
test. This consisted of eight crudely drawn pictures presented, 
by means of a special device, in cumulative horizontal segments. 
The test yielded two measures; 
(l) Alternative Hypotheses: a score determined by the number of 
different things which the subject reported that the picture 
•could be,' and 
(2) Cue Search: a measure based on the number of cumulative 
horizontal segments of the picture which the subject required to 
be exposed before he arrived at a final decision regarding the 
nature of the stimulus. Each subject was presented four pictures 
under the Low Stress condition and four under the High Stress 
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condition. The stress conditions were defined by the examiner's 
instructions and criticisms. 
The evidence supported the hypothesis that repressors formulate 
fewer alternative hypotheses and require less cue search to arrive 
at a final decision than do intellectualizers. In addition, re-
pressors undertook less cue search per alternative hypothesis 
than did intellectualizers. That is, the ratio of the number of 
alternative hypotheses formulated to the amount of cue search 
required for a final decision was higher for repressors than in-
tellectualizers. As the degree of stress associated with the 
decision making test was increased, both repressors and intellec-
tualizers decreased the number of alternative hypotheses which 
they formulated. The increased stress led to a decrease in the 
amount of cue search required for a final decision in the case of 
repressors, whereas intellectualizers showed andincrease on this 
measure as stress was increased. The ratio of the number of 
alternative hypotheses formulated to the amount of cue search 
required for a final decision was unaffected by increased stress 
in the case of repressors. Intellectualizers and combined de-
fense groups, however, decreased in their ratios as stress in-
creased. 
The major conclusions drawn from these results were: 
{1) Repressive defenses, which may be assumed to keep 
threatening material out of conscious awareness, may produce 
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a generalized restriction of the field of consciousness. In de-
cision making situations, this restriction of consciousness 
narrows the array of alternative hypotheses formulated and 
limits the amount of cue search required to check out each al-
ternative hypothesis. These consequences, in turn, restrict 
the amount of cue search required for a decision. 
(2) Intellectualized defenses, which may be assumed to 
shift attention away from the emotional significance of con-
flictual situations and onto affect-free, abstract ideation, may 
result in a generalized expansion of conscious ideation. In 
decision making situations, this expansion of consciousness 
widens the array of alternative hypotheses formulated and in• 
creases the amount of cue search required to check out each 
alternative hypothesis. As a result, the amount of cue search 
required for a final decision is increased. 
(3) Psychological stress has two kinds of effects on com• 
plex mental performance. On the one hand, it produces cognitive 
rigidity and "blocking." On the other hand, it increases 
reliance on preferred defenses and exaggerates characteristic 
response tendencies. 
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